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Abstract 
The Liability Directive adopted in 2004 by the European Parliament and the Board of 
Ministers of European Union, constitutes an innovation in comparison with former leg-
islations, as it broadens its scope further than the notion of traditional damage. The fun-
damental principle that the European liability regime introduces is the polluter pays 
principle, which sets the economic analysis of the Directive extremely significant. This 
thesis aims at presenting the aspects on economic efficiency of the liability Directive 
and the US regime in a comparative analysis and especially stressing the damage as-
sessment methodology which is included in the provisions of both regimes. 
An overview of law and economics review is provided in the introductory part of the 
dissertation, in an endeavor to stress the close connection between these great fields of 
study. The EU Liability Directive is analyzed in the second chapter of the thesis. The 
main issue that is examined is whether the Directive is efficient or not; thus its analysis 
from an economic perspective is imperative. In the last chapter the scrutiny of natural 
resource damage assessment methodologies takes place. Relative provisions of both the 
US and EU regimes are analyzed and compared from an economic point of view. In ad-
dition, the notion of monetary valuation is highlighted and the prevailing economic val-
uation techniques are briefly presented and evaluated. Only a few studies have been re-
alized regarding the topic of the third part of the thesis. However, efficiency considera-
tions with respect to environmental damage valuation techniques generate increasing 
interest among scholars during the last two decades. 
Literature references that have been occupied with the present topic to date, are focused 
only in specific issues, thus a literature review is not possible to be realized in this part 
of the dissertation; it will take place in several parts of the study though.  
This dissertation was written as a part of the MSc in Energy Systems at the International 
Hellenic University, with supervisor Professor G. Christonaki. 
 
Olga Stylou 
06/12/2013 
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1 Economic Analysis of Law- Introductory Remarks 
This chapter aims at setting out the definitions of some significant notions. It is meant to 
provide a useful background for the analysis that will follow.  
1.1 Basic principles of economic analysis of law 
The economic analysis of law examines the behavior of individuals towards a change in 
law and tries to find out when a rule or directive maximizes social welfare and econom-
ic efficiency. However, in order for the economic analysis to be understood, it is essen-
tial that some economic principles and definitions be mentioned. 
The economic analysis of law, also known as “law and economics” is an inter-
disciplinary subject, bringing together two great fields of study.
1
 Particularly, it derives 
from micro economics and focuses on economic efficiency and welfare maximization. 
2The latter one is a field of study of welfare economics and is based on the individual’s 
desire to maximize their own welfare. According to the well known English economist 
Pigou, welfare resides in a man’s state of mind or consciousness, which is made up by 
satisfaction or utilities.
3
 Hence, welfare is determined by the extent to which an individ-
ual’s desires are met. 
The cornerstone of economic analysis is that resources are finite. Hence, economics 
seek for these allocation decisions that lead to an efficient distribution of resources, 
such that the overall social utility is increased. More specifically, “an allocation of re-
sources is said to be efficient if it is not possible to make one or more persons better off 
without making one or more persons worse off”.4 This is also known as Pareto efficien-
cy or Pareto Optimality. However, when a change in the initial allocation is realized 
making one individual better off without leaving another worse off, then Pareto Im-
provement is being made. In case that all potential Pareto Improvements have been 
                                                 
1
 Anna Rita Germani (2004), Environmental Law and Economics in U.S and E.U.: A common 
ground? 
2
 K. De Smedt (2008), Environmental Liability in a Federal System: A Law and Economic Analysis, 
European Energy and Environmental Law Review 
3
 A. C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (1920), London: Macmillan, Part II 
4
 V. Pareto (1909), Manuel d’ Economie politique, Paris 
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made, the allocation is regarded as Pareto efficient.
5
 For instance, in case that near a res-
idential area an airport is deemed social optimum to be built, this makes some individu-
als better off, while hurts others concerned in view of the environmental impact of the 
problem. In this situation, social benefit may be considered to be greater than social 
cost, although residents near the airport are thought to be injured, because of the extra 
noise. However, a Pareto Improvement alternative would compensate the individuals 
that were harmed, making everyone better off. 
Pareto efficiency refers to the notion of allocative efficiency, which is achieved when 
the distribution of goods and services is optimal by reflecting the preferences of con-
sumers. Assuming a perfect competitive market,
6
 total economic welfare is maximized 
when prices equal marginal cost of production.
7
 Prices reflect the consumers’ willing-
ness to pay in order to obtain a certain good or service and equals the marginal utility 
they get from obtaining that good or service. When this marginal utility equals the mar-
ginal cost, optimal distribution is considered to be achieved. According to an alternative 
formulation, efficiency is the point where the goods are produced by sellers with the 
lowest cost and that they are consumed by buyers who value them the most. 
8
 
                                                 
5
  
Assuming that a market economy produces only two goods x,y which are demonstrated at the above 
graph at the horizontal and vertical axis respectively, the Pareto efficient points are A and B, instead 
point C is inefficient. A movement from point C to A or B is called Pareto Improvement, as an in-
crease in the amount of good x results in an increase in good y as well. 
6
 Perfect competition describes an ideal market with certain characteristics: there are many buyers 
and sellers who set the price of the product which is homogeneous. In addition, economic agents 
have access to information and there is perfect mobility of resources. This kind of market is a Pareto 
efficient market. A stock market might approximate this concept. 
7
 Marginal means an additional unit. Marginal cost (MC) is the change in the total cost of production 
that arises when the quantity produced increases by one unit. Mathematically it is demonstrated as 
the derivative of total production cost with respect to the level of output. Total cost (TC) equals the 
variable and fixed costs of production. 
8
 N. G. Mankiw(2011), Principles of Economics, South-western Cengage Learning 
According to Mankiw an efficient allocation maximizes the total surplus, which is the difference of 
the buyers’ willingness to pay minus the sellers’ cost of production. Total surplus also equals the 
consumer plus the producer surplus and demonstrates the total gains from trade in a market. Note 
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A great part of economics is concerned in avoiding inefficient economic outcomes and 
formulating policies which boost efficiency. Adam Smith has introduced in his contro-
versial work “The Wealth of Nations” the notion of the invisible hand, which unfolds a 
great influence for many economists until today. According to Adam Smith, under cer-
tain conditions and when a competitive market operates with substantial freedom, then 
it is able to regulate itself, resulting in the maximization of social welfare.
9
 However, 
when proper conditions are not achieved, because, for instance, of concentrated market 
power or information asymmetry for instance, markets do not allocate resources effi-
ciently. This phenomenon is called “market failure” and it is characterized by failure of 
price signals to reflect social costs and benefits in the right way. Thus, government in-
tervention is often considered necessary in order to implement policies which aim to 
economic efficiency. In addition, a clear definition and implementation of property 
rights are necessary in order for economic efficiency to be achieved. 
10
 
The other field being examined by “law and economics” is the reaction of individuals to 
certain changes in law and especially when incentives are given to them.
11
 A detailed 
analysis of individuals’ behavior can occur from the study of tort law. This branch of 
law focuses on situations at which some kind of damage is occurred. Liability rules that 
are most efficient in order to prevent this damage are determined by tort law. For in-
stance, in a situation where there is a factory contaminating a nearby river with industri-
al chemicals and local people who have to deal with the pollution, the polluter has to 
compensate the victim according to tort law. This is valid, not merely for the sake of the 
compensation itself; tort law aims to create an incentive to the polluter to avoid the pol-
lution instead of paying penalties. Given the assumption that individuals are rational, 
they will respond to the incentives given to them. This is the basic idea of tort law 
which aims at damage prevention caused by an imposition of more strict penalties, as 
individuals will react to the increased penalties by limiting their action relevant to the 
damage generation.  
                                                                                                                                               
that consumer surplus is the buyer’s gain from trading in the market and equals the value that the 
buyer put on a good minus the amount of money that the buyer actually pays in order to obtain the 
good. Producer surplus is equal to the amount of money a producer receives by selling a good minus 
the cost of producing that good.  
9
 A. Smith, (1776), The Wealth of Nations, Book IV, Chapter II 
10
 See subchapter below 
11
  The concise encyclopedia of Economics, Paul H. Rubin, Ed. Online at Library of Economics and 
Liberty 
-4- 
1.2 Property rights 
Equity and efficiency issues are derived from property rights. In any situation where 
there are conflicting interests between individuals or groups of individuals, law has to 
determine which of the conflicting parties will prevail. In addition, the state has to make 
a series of second order decisions, regarding the protection of entitlements or whether 
an individual is allowed to buy or sell the entitlement. There are three categories of enti-
tlements: those protected by property rules, others by liability rules and inalienable enti-
tlements. 
12
 
Economic science refers to property rights as a bundle of entitlements which define the 
privileges and limitations regarding the use of a resource by the individual owning it.
13
 
The nature of property rights is characterized by high complexity, however well defined 
property rights are of high importance, as they constitute an essential human right.
14
 An 
efficient structure of property rights includes three main characteristics, which are ex-
clusivity, transferability and enforceability. The first characteristic implies that all rights 
and duties are entitled to the owner of the resource, excluding everyone else from using 
it. Transferability allows the owner to transfer the property rights and these rights 
should be protected from encroachment by others according to enforceability.
15
 Accord-
ing to the Coase Theorem, when individuals have the ability to bargain and rights are 
transferable with negligent transaction costs, then the definition of property rights is not 
necessary, as individuals will end up with the most efficient solution by bargaining with 
each other.
16
  In a world that transaction costs are important, the situation changes 
though.   
A controversial issue is whether private or public ownership leads to less economic effi-
ciency, given that the “tragedy of the commons” is a negative result of public owner-
ship.
17
 This quotation refers to the depletion of common resources, as a consequence of 
                                                 
12
 This dissertation focuses on the entitlements protected by liability rules. 
See G. Calabresi and A. D. Melamed Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of 
the Cathedral (1972),  Yale Law School, Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 1983. 
13
 T. Tietenberg, L. Lewis, Environmental and Natoural Resource Economics (2012), Pearson Ed. 
14
 The concise encyclopedia of Economics, Armen A. Alchian, Ed. Online at Library of Economics 
and Liberty. 
15
 Tom Tietenberg, Lynne Lewis, Environmental and Natoural Resource Economics, 9
th
 edition 
(23). See also Bhattacharyya, S. C. (2011), Energy Economics: Concepts, Issues,Markets and Gov-
ernance, Springer, p.537. 
16
 See subchapter 1.3.2. 
17
 See The concise encyclopedia of Economics, Armen A. Alchian, Ed. Online at Library of Eco-
nomics and Liberty. 
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their overexploitation by self-interested individuals and the absence of rules on re-
sources’ use.18 The earth’s atmosphere, fish stocks and ground water are considered to 
be common goods. They are non excludable, allowing everyone to have access to them 
and rivalrous, implying increased utility for individuals who use them more. A common 
measure against this circumstance is state intervention with the aim to define property 
rights or directly manage the resource.  
Regarding environmental issues, there is higher difficulty to determine exact property 
rights, therefore they are often violated. For instance, when a factory emits smoke and 
acids in the air over the land owned by another party, it is controversial whether the fac-
tory is polluting the land without permission by the owner. Property rights determine 
the manner in which individuals use environmental resources. When property rights are 
too difficult to be defined or too costly, then state intervention is realized and environ-
mental laws are created.
19
  
1.3 Environmental damage as externality 
Actual market economies differ from ideal economies, in that they fail to distribute the 
resources in an efficient manner. This situation is known as “market failure”. One of the 
sources of externality is the lack of well defined property rights. Many authors claim 
that externalities derive from all kinds of market failures; however Baumol and Oates 
have formulated a more specific definition.  According to them, an external effect or 
externality occurs when the activities of an economic agent influence the utility or wel-
fare of another agent in such a way that is unintended and without compensation. 
20
  
In the case that an economic agent’s activity generates negative impact without com-
pensating the affected agents for it, then negative externality has occurred.
21
 Environ-
mental pollution is considered to be the most severe negative externality. Most envi-
ronmental externalities are of public variety, which relies on the idea of the jointness of 
supply, that is using of public goods by multiple individuals. Air pollution for instance, 
                                                 
18
 G. Hardin, Tragedy of the Commons (1968), Science 162: 1243-1248. 
19
 K. De Smedt, Environmental Liability in a Federal System: A Law and Economic Analysis(2008),  
European Energy and Environmental Law Review. 
20
 Baumol and Oates (1988), The theory of Environmental Policy,Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge. 
21
 In the case of positive externality net benefits are produced from an economic activity that make 
certain groups of individuals better off and without the requirement of monetary payment by them. A 
nice garden that beautifies the urban scenery in a residential area is considered to be a positive exter-
nality. 
-6- 
does not affect only one or a small group of individuals, but victims are jointly affected. 
22
 
When an externality is generated by an economic activity, then the society has to bear 
the negative impact. Thus, the social costs are higher than the private costs.
23
 For in-
stance, the acid smoke that emits a factory affects the visage of the surrounding build-
ings; as a result the maintenance cost for these buildings will rise. The factory pollutes 
the air, which is publicly owned, but this activity costs to society and, thus reduces so-
cial welfare.  
1.3.1 Internalization of externalities  
In his study “Some Thoughts on Risk Distributions and the Law of Torts ”, which was a 
milestone in the field of law and economics, Calabresi points out that activities should 
bear the costs they engender. He stresses that it is a matter of fairness that an industry 
should pay for the injuries it causes. 
24
 
A solution to the described market distortions would be a system which punishes the 
generation of harmful effects. In some cases this is achieved with government interven-
tion through pricing or regulation. 
25
When an efficient solution is reached in presence of 
an externality, then it is said that the externality is internalized. This is the aim of tax 
imposition and liability rules in the case of environmental externalities. A tax internaliz-
es an externality, when it equals the marginal environmental damage. This economic 
efficient tax is the well known Pigouvian tax.
26
 However, some externalities are not 
                                                 
22
 Subhes C. Bhattacharyya (2011), (538) 
23
  
The diagram demonstrates negative externalities, where the equilibrium output is higher than the 
social optimum. Markets overprovide the good, thus welfare loss is created, denoting an inefficient 
resource allocation. 
24
 Calabresi G., Some Thoughts on Risk Distributions and the Law of Torts (1961),  Faculty Schol-
arship Series. Paper 1979. 
25
 Subhes C. Bhattacharyya, Energy Economics (2011), p.155. 
26
 See generally Pigou, A.C., A Study in Public Finance, (1951),London, MacMillan. 
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worth to be corrected. After the tax imposition, the polluter has the choice of paying the 
tax or reducing his pollution level. The final decision is based on the cost- benefit anal-
ysis, which will be analyzed in next Chapters of the dissertation.
27
    
1.3.2 The Coase theorem 
Ronald Coase was among the economists who firstly supported the “law and econom-
ics” theory. His groundbreaking analysis on “The Problem of Social Cost”, explains that 
there is an ambiguity on the reason of creation of the externalities and points out the 
important role of liability rules in internalizing them. He also stresses that taxes and 
subsidies are the wrong solution in internalizing an externality, as they might lead to 
misallocation of resources given the reciprocal nature of externalities. 
28
The Coase The-
orem is considered fundamental in analyzing further the role of tort law and establishing 
efficient legal rules for the prevention of environmental damages. 
Coase is using the famous example of the rancher, whose cattle stray into the farmer’s 
land causing damage to the farmer’s crops, concludes that when transaction costs are 
negligible, then an economically efficient solution to an externality can be achieved 
through bargaining. In this case, the initial entitlement of property rights is not im-
portant, as the parties will reach the best result by bargaining with each other. In 
Coase’s example the fence between the rancher’s and the farmer’s land will be eventu-
ally build as soon as it costs less than the crop damage. 
29
 
However, Coase’s assumption about zero transaction cost negotiations is unrealistic. In 
real cases, usually a large number of participants are involved, thus transaction costs 
might be prohibitive. Big polluters often have the ability to affect easily the negotiation 
output, as their bargaining power is often greater than that of the victims. Moreover, 
property rights regarding environmental issues are difficult to be defined; hence there is 
the possibility of equity distortion. When property rights accrue to an industry, they can 
be transferred, attracting more industries, thus operating like subsidy
30
 providing wrong 
                                                 
27
 A significant controversy has burst among authors in whether the victims of externalities should 
be taxed or compensated. However, the taxation of externalities is outside of the scope of this disser-
tation. 
28
 William J.Baumol, On taxation and control of externalities (1972),  The American Economic Re-
view, Vol 62, No3, pp.307-322. 
29
 Coase, R.H., "The Problem of Social Cost",(1960) Journal of Law and Economics. 
30
 Subsidy is a benefit usually in the form of financial support given from the government to certain 
groups or individuals with the aim of promoting beneficial economic and social outcomes. Accord-
ing to Bhattacharyya, subsidies can be defined as the difference between the price that would exist in 
-8- 
signals to the economy.
31
  In other words, bargaining could be often deemed difficult to 
be successfully achieved. Even in cases that it is deemed necessary liability rules to 
come into force, the theorem constitute a useful background to the legislator.
32
 
1.3.3 Valuing environmental externalities 
Environmental resources are unpriced, as they are not traded in markets, they do have 
value though. As long as human well-being is affected positively or negatively by an 
environmental externality, there is value that follows this increase or decrease of well-
being. This value is necessary to be estimated in order for efficient decisions to be 
made.
33
 Given the above characteristics, in order for a victim to claim monetary com-
pensation for air pollution, pricing of the environmental resource is necessary. Howev-
er, putting monetary value on this kind of resources is a difficult endeavor.
34
 
A wide range of economics- based methods, the so-called valuation techniques are used 
for this purpose. Many authors claim that environmental policies should be based on 
cost- benefit analysis, by weighing the costs and benefits of environmental impacts. A 
crucial question concerning environmental damage evaluation is whether environmental 
pollution has to be reduced at any costs. These techniques, however, have inflicted con-
troversy among economists and environmental scientists. Firstly, there is ambiguity on 
whether evaluation methods can provide correct results and secondly, there are ethical 
issues deriving from the idea of pricing environmental issues. This kind of analysis has 
various limitations though. Evaluation techniques as well as cost-benefit analysis will 
be thoroughly examined in next Chapters of this thesis. 
                                                                                                                                               
a market in the absence of distortions or market failures and the price faced by the consumers at any 
given time. Subsidies may inflict market distortions, as they send wrong price signals to consumers 
and promote overconsumption. However, they may have positive effects when social cost or envi-
ronmental improvement exceeds the cost of subsidy. 
31
 Bhattacharyya (2011) 
32
 M.G. Faure, Environmental Law and Economics (2001), METRO, Maastricht, Netherlands,p 12-
17 
33
 Well-being in economics is used for quantitative methods with the intention to assess the quality 
of life of a group . See R. Perman, Y. Ma, J. McGilvray and M. Common (2003), Natural Resource 
and Environmental Economics, Addison-Wesley 
34
 See Ackermann/Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Pro-
tection, 150 University of Pennsylvania Law Review (2001/2002),  1553 et seq.; Adler, Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, Static Efficiency, and the Goals of Environmental Law, 31 Boston College Environmental 
Affairs Law Review (2004), 591 et seq. 
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1.4 The rationale of tort regulations 
Ronald Coase and the Italian American legal scholar and judge Guido Calabresi were 
among the pioneers in the field known as law and economics. One of their declarations 
was that the law could affect the behavior of potential tortfeasors and tort victims.
35
 
Tort law defines the applicable liability rules in case of an accident setting. The eco-
nomic approach of tort law is based on the idea that a liability rule will give incentives 
to potential parties of an accident for careful behavior. This approach emphasizes on the 
deterrence or prevention function of tort law. However, tort law focuses on another 
function as well, that of compensation. 
36
 More specifically, Accident law gives incen-
tives with the aim of reducing three types of costs, namely primary, secondary and ter-
tiary costs. In the first category accrue the preventive and the costs of the damage oc-
curred. Secondary costs refer to the loss spreading and tertiary costs are those that occur 
in case of a judicial proceeding. 
37,38
 
This difference in accidents between both approaches is also characterized as an ex ante 
and ex post vision, where economists tend to focus on the ex ante nature of the accident, 
whereas lawyers on the ex post vision of the accident. More specifically, economists 
examine how an ex post liability for damage will influence ex ante the precautionary 
behavior of potential parties of an accident. 
39
 
1.4.1 The significance of liability rules 
Whenever an individual might change the initial entitlement by paying an objectively 
determined value in order to obtain it, then this entitlement is protected by a liability 
rule. Hence liability rules involve an additional stage of state intervention. Entitlements 
                                                 
35  
Richard A. Posner, Guido Calabresi’s The Cost of Accidents: A Reassessment (2005), 64 Md. L. 
Rev.12 
36
 Michael G. Faure, Environmental Law and Economics (2001), METRO. See also K. De Smedt, 
Environmental Liability in a Federal System: A Law and Economic Analysis(2008),  European En-
ergy and Environmental Law Review 
37
 Calabresi G., Some Thoughts on Risk Distributions and the Law of Torts (1961),  Faculty Schol-
arship Series. Paper 1979 
38
 Accidents are distinguished in two types, unilateral and bilateral. In this dissertation only unilateral 
cases are examined, namely accidents in which only one party, the injurer, can influence the accident 
risk. This implies that the party which is harmed, the victim, does not influence the possibility of the 
accident occurrence, neither the gravity of the accident. See K. De Smedt (2008); Shavell (1987) 
39
 Faure (2001), K.de Smedt (2008) 
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are not only protected, but also their transfer is allowed if the interested party is willing 
to pay a certain value determined by the state rather than the parties themselves.
40
 
Liability rules are applicable in situations where one person, the injurer, causes harm to 
another, the victim. Whether the injurer is liable for the accident and whether he should 
compensate the victim is defined by the liability rules. In tort law are used two liability 
rules, the strict liability and negligence. 
41
 
Under a strict liability rule the injurer has to compensate the victim in any case, no mat-
ter what care he took in each individual case. He has to bear all the costs of the accident. 
Contrary to this, under a negligence rule, the injurer can avoid liability if he takes the 
appropriate care, as determined by law or the court.  
The basic goal of tort law is the minimization of primary accident costs, which include 
the precautionary costs and the costs of the expected damage. This implies that the costs 
of an accident do not only incorporate the damage after the accident has occurred, but 
also the costs for care made by the potential parties in order to prevent the accident. 
42
 
The care level that is deemed appropriate in order to prevent an accident is called “due 
care”. 43 
The determination of the optimal due care level is often accomplished with a cost- bene-
fit analysis. The optimal level of precaution, namely where the minimization of acci-
dent’s costs take place, is realized at the level where the marginal costs of care taking 
equals the marginal benefit
44
 in accident reduction. From an economic point of view, 
given that precaution has a price, liability rules should not give incentives to avoid eve-
ry accident that could occur, but should imply some weighing of costs and benefits. 
45
 
An accident is efficient to be avoided only when marginal costs of precaution are lower 
than or equal to the marginal benefits of accident reduction.   
                                                 
40
 See G. Calabresi and A. D. Melamed Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View 
of the Cathedral (1972),  Yale Law School, Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 1983 
41
 K. De Smedt (2008)  
42
 Michael G. Faure, Environmental Law and Economics (2001), METRO 
43
 K. De Smedt (2008) 
44
 Marginal benefit is the additional satisfaction or utility that an individual receives from consuming 
an additional unit of a good or service.  
45
Faure (2001). See also Michael G. Faure, Economic Analysis of Environmental Law: An Introduc-
tion (2001), IDEP 
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1.5 Environmental liability 
Environmental liability rules provide incentives to the polluters to invest in environmen-
tal friendly technologies or take the optimal care in order to avoid an environmental 
damage. In this way, through liability rules environmental externalities can be internal-
ized. The analysis of environmental liability follows basically the analysis of tort law.
46
 
1.5.1 Avoiding environmental harm I: The price of negligence 
The negligence rule provides incentives to the potential polluter, mainly to the operator 
of an environmentally relevant installation, to invest in care, in order to reach the opti-
mal standard. The polluter is required to pay compensation only if he spends less on 
care than the level the legal system has defined as the optimal care standard, known as 
due care. Thus, incentives are given to the polluters to avoid liability by taking the ap-
propriate care, as this will lead to their utility maximization. For instance, it is efficient 
for a polluting firm to invest in environmental friendly technology rather than paying 
penalties for not taking the appropriate ex ante action.
47
 
In case that the polluter invests less on care than the required care level, then precau-
tionary costs will be lower, but he will obliged to pay compensation for the expected 
damage. Therefore, his total costs will be eventually increased. On the other hand, there 
is no incentive for the polluter to take more care than the optimal standard the legal sys-
tem requires him to do, as he can avoid liability by reaching the due care standard. In 
other words, a negligence rule leads to efficient outcomes, as soon as the care taken by 
the polluter equals the due care standard.
48
 
1.5.2 Avoiding environmental harm II: Strict liability 
The polluter is obliged to bear all the accident costs, including the precaution costs and 
the costs of the expected damage. A strict liability rule leads to economic efficient out-
comes by giving the polluter incentives for optimal care taking, which results in the 
minimization of total accident costs. If he/she invests less in care than the optimal, then 
the expected damage will be greater inflicting higher costs, however, if he/she invests 
                                                 
46
 K. De Smedt (2008) 
47
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48
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more in care his precaution costs will be high enough to lead to an inefficient outcome. 
Thus, injurers seek for the optimal level of care in order to minimize their total costs.
49
 
1.5.3 Negligence versus Strict liability 
It is concluded that in unilateral accidents both negligence and strict liability rules can 
lead to economic efficient outcomes, by minimizing the primary accident costs. Howev-
er there are some important differences between the rules which is crucial to be men-
tioned.  
Shavell has devoted a large part of his work in analyzing the activity level that influ-
ences the accident risk. He stresses that apart from adopting the optimal level of care, 
liability rules should give incentives for adopting an optimal activity level as well, 
which denotes the times that the polluter is involved in environmental risky activity.
50
 
However, activity level is not incorporated in the due care level in negligence rule. Pol-
luters are not held liable if they take the optimal care, consequently there is the possibil-
ity to engage in the pollution activity too often. On the other hand, in strict liability the 
injurer is always liable for the accident, therefore he has to search for the optimal activi-
ty level that minimizes his total costs. In this way the externality is internalized, thus 
strict liability rule might be preferable in case of environmental damages on following 
grounds.  
As far as the compensation is concerned, both rules differ significantly. As already stat-
ed, under strict liability all costs accrue to the polluter who has to compensate the victim 
regardless the care he took. On the contrary, under negligence the polluter has only to 
comply with the legal standard of due care, which settles the victim to bear the cost of 
the damage clean-up. However, in this way the cost of the environmental damage does 
not accrue fully to the liable individual for the accident. Therefore, there might be a 
preference to opt for a strict liability rule.
51
 
Regarding tertiary costs, namely the administrative and information costs there are 
some considerable differences too. The information that the court needs in order to de-
termine the optimal care level each time an accident occurs might not be readily availa-
ble. Thus, negligence rule is characterized by high information costs. In strict liability 
                                                 
49
 See M.G.Faure (2001) and K. de Smedt(2008) 
50
 S. Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence (1980), The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol 9, No 1, 1-
25. See also K. de Smedt (2008) and M.G. Faure (2001) 
51
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these costs are borne by the injurer, who is always liable for the accident. According to 
bibliography, the court might not have always the appropriate information in order to 
determine the efficient care level, whereas polluting firms seem to obtain the necessary 
information more readily. This constitutes another argument in favor of strict liability 
for environmental damages. 
52
  
Until this point, it is assumed that the polluter in an environmental accident setting 
would be able to pay compensation to the victim. However, if the assets of the polluting 
firm are less than the amount of the damage occurred, the problem of underdeterrence 
arises in strict liability. This implies that the polluter will only take that level of care 
which equals the amount to his wealth. Thus, he will only avoid accidents with a magni-
tude equal his wealth.
53
 
1.6 Conclusions 
The field known as Law and Economics has established a notable background for deci-
sion makers, in order for efficient outcomes to be produced as a result of their policies. 
Law and Economics has contributed a lot to the field of environmental economics, es-
pecially regarding the restoration and compensation of environmental pollution.  
One source of environmental pollution lies in the fact that some activities cause nega-
tive side effects to third parties. These negative outcomes are caused due to lack of 
well- defined property rights or due to other kinds of market distortions. Pollution is 
considered to be a negative externality which causes environmental harm. In this case, 
prices do not reflect the true cost of goods and services, giving as a consequence wrong 
price signals to society, which leads to inefficient outcomes. In such situations envi-
ronmental liability rules come into force. These rules give incentives to the polluters to 
take under consideration the pollution they are causing. In this way the environmental 
externality is internalized, which constitutes one of the main goals of the economic 
analysis of environmental law. So far, environmental liability seems to be in line with 
the economic analysis of tort law. Between the applicable liability rules, strict liability 
rule is preferable rather than the negligence in several respects. However, regarding in-
solvency of the polluter, negligence rule proves to be more effective than strict liability.   
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2 Environmental Liability Directive- an efficient regime? 
2.1 A brief overview of the ELD 
On 21 April 2004 the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament adopted the 
Directive 2004/35/EC on Environmental Liability with regard to prevention and reme-
dying of environmental damage, which was on discussion from early 2002. Environ-
mental liability is the mechanism through which the cost of an environmental harm oc-
curred is transferred to whom is responsible for it. Hence, the key point of environmen-
tal liability is the assignment of a charge to the environmental damage occurred. The 
European Directive (2004/35/EC) provides a legal framework for implementing envi-
ronmental liability and the “polluter pays” principle in the European Union industrial 
sector.
54
 
The necessity in confronting with environmental damages in Europe has emerged since 
the 1970s. It is notable to be mentioned that Green Paper
55
 and White Paper
56
 which 
were published in 1993 and 2000 respectively constituting significant steps of the EU 
legislation regarding environmental issues.  
The Environmental Liability Directive or ELD, constitutes a common framework 
among EU Member States which aims at the preventing and the facing certain types of 
environmental harm caused by polluting firms. Much freedom is given to the Member 
States though, regarding several aspects of the implementation of the Directive, as de-
scribed in its provisions. In addition, it is observed that the Directive includes some in-
accuracies and omit some crucial matters which merit to be mentioned, as they might 
lead to inefficient outcomes. Furthermore, it is in the focus of the present study to scru-
tinize the Directive from an economic point of view, with the aim to deduce whether it 
contributes to internalizing the external costs.  
                                                 
54
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 White Paper on environmental liability, COM(2000) 66 final 
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2.1.1 The underlying principles of the Directive 
The fundamental principle that the Liability Directive introduces is the polluter pays 
principle. Other principles that can be deduced from the objective of the Directive are 
the proportionality and subsidiarity, as well as the preventive principle, although they 
are not clearly mentioned in the Directive. 
2.1.2 The Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) 
The sense of the Principle actually derives from its name, as it means that the person or 
persons who are responsible for pollution should pay for the costs of cleaning up. It in-
cludes an equity notion, as its objective is to protect third parties from paying the cost of 
pollution in which they did not contributed.
57
 The polluter pays principle can be clearly 
be identified in the Preamble
58
, as well as in the first Article of the Directive, where it is 
clearly mentioned that the Liability Directive is based on this Principle. 
The PPP, is essentially an economic principle translated into law. From an economic 
point of view, polluter pays principle can be examined in terms of efficiency.  It is al-
ready mentioned that pollution constitutes the more significant environmental externali-
ty. PPP aims at internalizing this externality by obliging those causing the pollution to 
bear the cost of it. In the case of an industrial firm, this cost will be reflected in the price 
of the product, therefore it will be borne by the producers and consumers of the product, 
rather than the society. Therefore, prices will rise and as a consequence, ceteris paribus, 
demand for this product will fall.
59
 Consumers’ preferences for lower prices will be an 
                                                 
57
 For more details see Arne Bleeker, Does the Polluter Pay? The Polluter- Pays Principle in the 
Case Law of the European Court of Justice (2009), European Energy and Environmental Law Re-
view, p. 289 and Margaret Rosso Grossman, Agriculture and the Polluter pays Principle:An Intro-
duction (2006),  59 Okla. L. Rev. 1, 1-39; ; L. Krämer, Discussions on Directive 2004/35 Concern-
ing Environmental Liability(2005), JEEPL 4, p. 252-253; Cassotta S. (2012), p. 151. 
58
 Preambular (2) and (18) of the ELD and Art 174 of EC Treaty, with a different wording though in 
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59
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incentive for producers to produce more environmental friendly products.
60
 In this way, 
environmental pollution will be decreased.  
However, there is controversy over the efficiency of polluter pays principle, as it is am-
biguous whether it does provide help at the policy level and whether the liability should 
be extended in case the polluter is unable to pay his costs.
61
 For answering these com-
plex matters an excursus is appropriate to following three principles which are as well 
promoted in the ELD. 
2.1.3 Subsidiarity, Proportionality and Preventive Principle 
The subsidiarity and proportionality principles are introduced in Article 5 (2) of the EC 
Treaty.
62
 According to these provisions, the principle of subsidiarity states that in areas 
of mixed competencies the Union
63
 may take action only if and insofar as the objectives 
of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved at the level of the Member States 
and therefore, can be better achieved at the EU level for reasons of scale or effects.
64
 
Thus, this principle determines whether the Union may take action.
65
 
The subsidiary principle is connected to the principle of proportionality,
66
 according to 
which any action by the Union shall not go beyond the inevitable restrictions that are 
justified by the pursuit of the objective of environmental protection.
67
 Thus, when ex-
amining measures relating to environmental protection whether adopted at national or 
Community level, any court needs to perform a two-tier evaluation, known as propor-
tionality test. The first tier examines the suitability of the restrictive measures regarding 
the objective of environmental protection. The second tier seeks for the potentially less 
restrictive measures; it gives in other words emphasis on the proportional character of 
                                                                                                                                               
Since the only variable that changes is price, there is movement along the demand curve, as shown 
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the measures. This means that the legislative measures should be not less effective in 
achieving the objective of environmental protection, while the least harmful to other 
interests and values which are also EU policy objectives.
68
   
The prevention principle was firstly introduced in the Single European Act and is also 
involved in the European Treaty.
69
 Contrary to the polluter pays principle, it is not men-
tioned in the Liability Directive however, it is clear that it constitutes one of the objec-
tives of the Directive, as enshrined in Articles 1 and 3.
70
This principle calls for taking 
action in order to protect the environment at an early stage, with a view to avoiding 
damage from occurring rather than repairing it. The preventive character of the principle 
is formed in Articles 5 and 6 of the Directive. Article 5 stresses the obligation of the op-
erator or the competent authority to take preventive measures before the damage has 
occurred, with the aim to avoid environmental harm. In Article 6 emphasis is given in 
the situation after the damage has occurred, where the operator or the competent author-
ity is obliged to take preventive measures in order to avoid the further spread of the en-
vironmental harm. Hence, preventive principle encompasses a double function: one 
function focuses on the environmental damage before it occurs, in order to avoid it and 
the other after the damage has occurred, in order to avoid it from spreading. Further-
more, in order to prove that prevention is better than cure, it is crucial to be mentioned 
that the preventive principle complies with environmental economics, as it is much 
cheaper to invest in preventing an environmental damage rather than restoring it after 
the accident has occurred, which demonstrates in turn the economic character of the 
polluter pays principle.
71
 
2.1.4 ELD- a liability regime? 
Directive 2004/35 is called a liability Directive. However, it is considered to constitute a 
different type of liability, as it does not represent the traditional civil liability described 
                                                 
68
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in tort law.
72
. There is a controversy over what type of liability the Directive follows; it 
seems that it is ,in view of the basic constellation of actors and the tools for administra-
tive action which are made available to the environmental authorities ,closer to the ad-
ministrative law though, combined with private law aspects such as strict and fault- 
based liability.
73
 More specifically, otherwise than civil liability, where a private person 
is held liable by another private person, whose interests are encroached by the first, in 
the Directive, the parties involved are the private polluter and the competent authority, 
namely public authority; hence, the Directive, as a consequence of the US notion of the 
public trustee moved away from civil law notions by not including physical injury and 
economic loss, the so-called traditional damage and giving environmental organizations 
the right to request for action before public authorities in relation to the operator.
74
 As 
Juliane Kokott, involved as an Advocate General at the Court of Justice of the European 
Union in several environmentally relevant cases brought before the Court, points out, 
public paw is featured by instruments which remove danger and perform remediation, 
thus it seems more suitable in confronting in a direct and effective manner environmen-
tal damage.
75 76
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2.1.5 Scope: Compensable damage77 
Liability Directive as defined in Article 3
78
, aims at remedying and preventing “envi-
ronmental damage”. The fact that liability is extended to environmental damage as such,  
regardless any infringements of property rights of the wronged persons, is considered to 
be a great innovation of the Directive.
79
 
“Environmental damage” is defined as “a measurable adverse change in a natural re-
source or measurable impairment of a natural resource service”.80 The Directive distin-
guishes three categories of environmental damage: damage to protected species and 
natural habitats, water damage and damage affecting land.
81
 
Regarding the first category, there are certain exceptions which are considered crucial to 
be highlighted.
82
 Precisely, there is limitation of the damage to protected species and 
habitats only to those defined under the Habitats
83
 and Wild Birds
84
 Directives or under 
equivalent national legislation. These Directives form Natura 2000,
85
 according to 
which in 2009 the protected area covered was approximately only 24% of the Commu-
nity land area.
86
 The criteria on assessing the significance of the adverse effects are set 
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out in Annex I of the Liability Directive. Hence, it is obvious that the Directive has 
formulated a narrow scope by protecting only certain species and habitats and is based 
on pre- existing Community legislation, which is considered to have limited implemen-
tation. However, Member States have the possibility to enlarge the scope of the Di-
rective regarding the species and habitats protected, through their national laws.
87
 
Water damage is qualified in relation to the EC Water Framework Directive, as any sig-
nificant adverse effect on water according to the water quality categories defined by the 
Directive.
88
 The liability regime is applicable to land damage only if there is contamina-
tion of land that creates a significant risk to human health.
89
 Hence, land damage in un-
inhabited areas will fall outside the scope of the Directive.
90
 
Traditional damage, such as damage to the person and property or economic loss, is ex-
cluded from the scope of application of the Directive. This denotes that private parties 
do not have right to compensation for damage or imminent threat of damage. In such 
cases, compensation will be determined by national rules of civil liability, as Member 
States are entitled to enact appropriate measures in order to prevent double recovery 
costs. 
To conclude, the Directive covers environmental damage to the “natural re-
sources”91which include protected species and natural habitats, water and land damage. 
The protection of species, habitats and water are based on existing Directives, involving 
only certain species and habitats and waters.
92
 This indicates the narrow scope of the 
Directive, by protecting only certain species and habitats. Member States do have the 
capability to broaden the scope and involve more species under their national legisla-
tion; however this does not boost cross-border harmonization regarding environmental 
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protection, as it promotes disparity among national legislations. In fact, one accident 
might require that two different regimes shall apply, the Liability Directive and a na-
tional or European legislation.
93
 In addition, land is slightly protected, as only contami-
nation of land in case of significant risk of human health falls into the scope of the Di-
rective. This demonstrates the poor subject matter of the Directive regarding soil protec-
tion. Land is as important a natural resource as the other categories covered by the lia-
bility regime, thus it should be protected not only in case that occurs risk to human 
health and not only in case of contamination as the type of the damage covered.
94
 
Hence, the Liability Directive aims at protecting only three categories of natural re-
sources and not the environment as a whole, ignoring other important natural resources 
such as air. Thus, the scope of the Directive is considered to be narrow, including inac-
curate and perplexing definitions which create an ambiguous background for the envi-
ronmental protection.  
2.1.6 Liable operator 
The operator, who caused environmental damage, as mentioned in Article 3 (b) of the 
Directive, should be held financially liable in order for the polluter pays principle to be 
accomplished.
95
 The definition of the term “operator” results from a combination of in 
Article 2, paragraphs (6) and (7).
96
 A significant observation is that the Directive pertain 
operator duties with regard to the public and not the private interest.
97
 
The Directive distinguishes two liability regimes according to the type of activity of the 
operator, the strict liability regime and the fault liability regime, as mentioned in Article 
3 (1). The strict liability regime applies to those operators whose activities are hazard-
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ous or potentially hazardous, as listed in Annex III of the Directive. Under this liability 
regime all types of environmental damage are covered. On the contrary, the fault based 
liability applies to operators whose activities are not listed in Annex III and the only 
type of damage covered is damage to protected species and natural habitats. Liability 
regimes are clearly demonstrated in the figure below: 
 
 
Figure 1. Liability Regimes in the ELD (Source: Swiss RE, 2007)
98
 
 
Activities listed in Annex III are considered to be industrial activities, including waste 
management operations, the discharge of dangerous substances or pollutants into 
groundwater or surface water, water abstraction and impoundment of water, manufac-
ture, use, storage, processing, filling and release into the environment of dangerous sub-
stances and preparations. Moreover, Annex III touches upon transport by road, rail, in-
land waterways, sea or air of dangerous or polluting goods and use, transport or release 
of genetically modifies organisms. However, there are other activities, other than the 
“occupational activities” mentioned above that can cause environmental harm and could 
be added in the Directive. 
Hence, under strict liability, operators are liable only if they conduct the activities listed 
in the Annex. Then, the entire range of environmental damage is covered. Operators, 
who are at fault conducting non-Annex III activities, are liable only for biodiversity 
damage. Consequently, in case that an operator causes damage to biodiversity without 
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being at fault or if he causes damage to water or land, the Liability Directive does not 
apply.
99
 Therefore, the Directive covers only certain activities, which are limited in the 
“occupational activities” of the Annex. In addition, the fault based liability covers only 
damage to protected species and habitats, as these species are considered to be particu-
larly exposed and vulnerable.
100
 However, this fact does not justify this provision of the 
Directive, as the protection of the environmental resources involving water and land are 
as important as the protection of biodiversity. 
2.1.7 Exemptions from liability 
The Liability Directive provides for a variety of exemptions from liability, available for 
the operators. Article 4 of the Directive defines the following cases which are excluda-
ble from liability: act of armed conflict and natural phenomena of exceptional, inevita-
ble and irresistible character
101
 and activities which serve national defense or interna-
tional security.
102
 Maritime disasters,
103
 nuclear risks
104
 and cases which fall within the 
scope of International Conventions listed in Annex IV,
105
 are also excluded. This last 
exemption merits more attention. The reason why environmental damage or imminent 
threat of damage which falls within the scope of International Conventions are not in-
volved in the Liability Directive is that it is considered that these Conventions provide a 
wider scope of application, as they are implemented worldwide. However, an environ-
mental damage might not have to be restored under an international convention, as these 
conventions provide limited remediation measures.
106
 Hence, such damage might re-
main uncompensated or without remediation, as liability regime will not apply for this 
damage. Moreover, the Directive is applicable “to environmental damage or imminent 
                                                 
99
The European Directive on Environmental Liability –“Polluter Pays”: from principle to practice? 
An Environmental NGO commentary on the Environmental Liability Directive: its adoption at EU 
level and what it means for the future, June 2004, WWF for a living planet p. 30-31 
100
 C. Pirotte (2004), A Brief Overview of Directive 2004/35/EC on Environmental Liability, p. 9 
101
 ELD, Art. 4 (1) 
102
 ELD, Art. 4 (6) 
103
 ELD, Art. 4 (3) 
104
 ELD, Art. 4 (4) 
105
 ELD, Art. 4 (2) 
106
 G. Winter, J.H. Jans, R. Marcory and L. Kramer, Weighing up the Liability Directive (2008), 
Journal of Environmental Law, Oxford University Press, p. 173. See also Cassotta S. (2012) , "Envi-
ronmental Damage and Liability Problems in a Multilevel Context: The case of Environmental Lia-
bility Directive", Kluwer Law International, p. 87. 
 
  -25- 
threat of damage caused by pollution of a diffuse character only where there is causal 
link between the damage and the activities of individual operators”.107 The interpreta-
tion of this clause is that only damage caused by widespread activities without a discrete 
source is covered by the liability regime.
108
 Pollution caused by car drivers or house-
holds can be considered an example of exemption. In addition, the Directive gives em-
phasis on the causal link between the negative environmental effect and activitites of the 
operator. Thus, for any damage for which there is not proven causality between the en-
vironmental harm and the operator, the so-called “orphan damage”, the liability regime 
does not apply, the state, therefore, is not obliged to bear the remediation costs. Another 
clause crucial to be mentioned is that the Directive does not apply to damage occurred 
before 30 April 2007.
109
 To conclude, the entity of these exemptions renders the scope 
of application of the European liability regime even narrower.
110
  
Besides these exemptions, there are two crucial rules which the liability Directive intro-
duces as defenses for the operator, the so called “compliance with permit”111 and “state-
of-the-art defense”.112 They constitute another exemption of the Directive; however they 
have been described as a “mitigating factors” clause.113 According to Article 8, the op-
erator is not obliged to bear the cost of remediation if he is not at fault, if the damage 
was caused by an activity subject to any permit given under the measures listed in An-
nex III or if the damage occurred was not considered to cause environmental harm, giv-
en the scientific knowledge at the time that the damage occurred. Finally, the implemen-
tation-either partial or complete- of this clause is left to the choice of Member States. 
These defenses have inflicted great controversy, as it is claimed that they undermine the 
regime of the Directive and weaken national laws of liability.
114
 As the basic principle 
                                                 
107
 ELD, Art. 4 (5) 
108
 The definition of “diffuse pollution” according to the European Environment Agency, available 
online at: http://www.eea.europa.eu/themes/water/wise-help-centre/glossary-definitions/diffuse-
pollution 
109
 ELD, Art 17. More analytically in subchapter below 
110
 However, the above exemptions are justifiable on the basis of “force majeure”, which is a tradi-
tional defense accepted in almost every liability regime. It actually frees the parties from liability in 
cases that are beyond the control of the parties, such as wars, earthquakes, hurricanes. K. De Smedt 
describes briefly the function of force majeure: K. De Smedt (2008), p. 225.  
111
 ELD, Art. 8§4(a) 
112
 ELD, Art. 8§4(b) 
113
 The European Directive on Environmental Liability –“Polluter Pays”: from principle to practice? 
An Environmental NGO commentary on the Environmental Liability Directive: its adoption at EU 
level and what it means for the future, June 2004, WWF for a living planet p. 32 
114
 See K De Smedt (2008), p.190 and The European Directive on Environmental Liability –
“Polluter Pays”: from principle to practice?, p. 32 
-26- 
of the Directive is the aforementioned polluter pays principle, according to which liabil-
ity is imposed on the operator regardless of the case that he is not negligent; the liability 
regime promotes in other words the strict liability rule. These exemptions are consid-
ered to relativize an effective application of this principle, obviously in favor of promo-
tion of market and competition- related considerations.
115
 However, they are also said to 
promote competition in the European industry.
116
 
2.1.8 Preventive and Remedial measures 
An operator who is aware of an imminent threat of environmental damage is required to 
take the necessary preventive measures.
117
 After taking such action, if the threat re-
mains, the operator should inform the competent authority as soon as possible.
118
 Thus, 
the preventive function of the liability regime is once again emphasized. In addition, the 
competent authority is expected to instruct the operator in taking the appropriate 
measures,
119
 even to demand that he/she takes these measures.
120
 However, in case that 
the operator cannot be identified or is unable to bear the cost of the preventive 
measures, then the competent authority is entitled to take the measures itself.
121
 
Besides the prevention of environmental damage, Article 6 of the Directive emphasizes 
on the restoration of the damage, in case that environmental harm finally occurs. The 
liable operator should inform the competent authority and take the necessary remedial 
measures in order to limit the damage or avoid further damage from occurring.
122
 Simi-
larly to the previous situation described, the competent authority has also comprehen-
sive power over the necessary remedial actions, but it will only take these measures it-
self as a means of last resort.
123
 Annex II provides a common framework for Member 
States to identify and choose the remedial options available, in order to restore the natu-
ral resources. It should be noted that for the selection of the restoration measures the 
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compatibility with the requirements set by the proportionality principle can be cru-
cial.
124
  
The Annex provides for remediation for the three categories of natural resources cov-
ered by the Directive, namely protected species and natural habitats, water and land. 
Regarding the first two categories, remediation insinuates the return of damaged re-
sources and/or impaired services to baseline condition that is defined as the condition in 
which these resources or services would have been had the damage not occurred, esti-
mated on the basis of the best information available.
125
 Remediation of land damage 
implies only the elimination of any significant risk of adversely affecting human health, 
without requiring return to the baseline condition.
126
 
A scrutiny of Articles 5, 6, 7 and Annex II of the Directive leads to the deduction that 
the primary purpose of the liability regime is to ensure that the environment will be re-
stored. Monetary compensation is not premised in the provisions of the Directive, in 
fact it is indicated that regarding “interim losses”, compensatory remediation does not 
consist of financial compensation to members of the public.
127
 However, when compen-
satory restoration measures are not possible, alternative valuation techniques, such as 
monetary valuation may also be used. The main difficulty is that market prices for cal-
culating the amount of compensation are not available. Thus, there are various assess-
ment methods, the most often used of which, are the avoidance- cost approach, the he-
donic- price approach and the contingent valuation method.
128
 However, these tech-
niques are limited in their applicability mainly from a legal and insurance point of 
view.
129
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A significant observation that merits attention is that according to Articles 5 (4) and 6 
(3) of the Directive, the competent authority may take preventive and remediation 
measures itself in case of an orphan damage, but it is not obliged to do so. Hence, there 
is the possibility that environmental harm not to be restored. These provisions of the 
Directive can be considered to constitute an opposition to the polluter-pays principle. 
However, it should be noted that once again the choice is given to the Member States to 
decide whether they will follow a more strict liability regime by requiring financial 
guarantees by the operator as indicates Article 8 (2).
130
 
2.2 Excursus: US legislation 
In the US federal law the most prominent environmental damage statutes are the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) and 
Oil Pollution Act (OPA). Both statutes are characterized by some differences, as for in-
stance the separate Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) regulations. How-
ever, in- depth analysis of the US legislation statutes falls outside of the scope of this 
thesis. Only a general background of the US legislation will follow in order to enable a 
comparison with the principal provisions of the ELD in favour of assessing the efficien-
cy of the latter. 
2.2.1 Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act 
(CERCLA) 
CERCLA of 1980 including Superfund Amendments of 1986 are the first comprehen-
sive statutes addressing environmental liability in the US. CERCLA created a qualified 
scheme for remedying a release or threatened release of “hazardous substances” into 
land, air, water and/or endangered species.
131
 In addition, the statute established the 
“Superfund” in order to help the funding of the remediation costs when a financially 
solvent polluter could not be found.
132
 The aim of this fund was to provide for clean-up 
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but not for extended remediation, in cases that the responsible operator could not be 
found.
133
 
CERCLA contained the provisions of significant importance for the recovery of natural 
resource damages at that time. Precisely, it contains two innovations that play a funda-
mental role in the development of a natural resource damage program.
 
Firstly, it author-
ized the formation of federal, state and tribal officials to act as “trustees” in order to re-
cover damages from injured resources on behalf of the public. Secondly, CERCLA re-
quired the federal government to issue regulations identifying the “best available proce-
dures” for assessing natural resource damages.134  
US environmental law established strict liability for all kinds of polluters, though this is 
not explicitly stated in the statute. In addition, retroactive liability is imposed on the pol-
luters by the Act. Furthermore, all operators who contributed to an environmental dam-
age are jointly and severally liable for clean-up costs, which means that in case a pollut-
er is unable to pay the cost of his contribution to the environmental damage, then the 
other contributors to the injured site are obliged to bear the cost of that polluter too. 
However, in such a case, the other contributors to the damage occurred will pay more 
than their fair share of the clean-up expenses.
135
 CERCLA does not provide any specific 
measure for damage, it implies however, that essential damages might be awarded even 
if restoration is not always technically possible. Clean-up standards are based on the 
most restrictive federal standards
136
. Polluters are expected to remediate sites according 
to the levels indicated by those strict standards, unless the sites qualify for “brownfield 
status”. In such a case injured sites will be cleaned up to a lesser degree but only for a 
certain use, such as commercial property.
137
 Furthermore, the statute states that the 
damage assessment regulations address direct and indirect injury, destruction or loss, 
thus shall take into consideration factors including, but not limited to, replacement val-
ue, use value and the ability of the ecosystem to recover.
138
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2.2.2 Oil Pollution Act (OPA) 
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 was passed in the wake of the Exxon Valdez oil spill to 
consolidate and reform the legislation regarding oil spills and to provide a comprehen-
sive response to oil spills that affect navigable waters.
139
 One of the most important and 
controversial elements of this Act is that, which refers to the treatment of natural re-
source damages.
140
 Likewise CERCLA, this statute requires the determination of feder-
al, state and tribal natural resource trustees, but according to its provisions it also allows 
foreign governments to assert claims for damage to their natural resources.
141
 The Sec-
retary of Commerce, acting through the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion (NOAA), as well as the Department of the Interior (DOI) have been the most active 
of the federal trustees.
142
 The OPA, similarly to CERCLA, established strict liability for 
polluters, who are also jointly and severally liable for clean-up costs. 
The application field of natural resource damages under OPA is considered to be broad. 
OPA provides that natural resource claims are based on the restoration of public re-
sources and have three basic components. More specifically, the measure of damages is 
the cost of restoring, rehabilitating, replacing or acquiring the equivalent of the dam-
aged net resources. This procedure constitutes the primary restoration of the injured site. 
Secondly, the measure of damages is the diminution in value of the natural resources 
pending recovery of the resource to baseline, which is also known as the interim loss 
value and it is indemnified through compensatory restoration and lastly, the reasonable 
cost of assessing those damages.
143
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2.2.3 A brief comparison of the US and the EU legislations 
European Directive, as well as US statutes aim at establishing a framework of environ-
mental liability based on the polluter-pays principle, to prevent and remedy environ-
mental damage.
144
 Under CERCLA the potential responsible party to bear the cost of 
cleaning-up an injured site falls into four categories
145, while in the ELD the “operator” 
is held liable when environmental damage is caused due to his activity. The definition 
of the “operator” under the European Directive seems to be general, even inaccurate in 
comparison to that under CERCLA. In addition, there is a difference in the provisions 
of EU and US legislation regarding the natural resources to which clean-up liability ap-
plies. Under CERCLA “natural resources” have a substantially broader definition than 
that of the ELD, consequently clean-up liability is also broadly applied.
146
 However, 
European law covers a much broader range of activities than the US legislation does, as 
it also includes the transport of polluting goods and the environmental risk of genetical-
ly modified organisms (GMOs).
147
  
Unlike the US statutes, which, as already explained, apply strict liability to all releases 
of hazardous substances, the ELD provides for two types of liability, namely the strict 
and negligent liability. Their implementation depends on the nature of the activity asso-
ciated with the environmental damage caused. Another difference is that the US statutes 
impose joint and several liability, whereas the ELD does not foresee cost allocation in 
case that damage is caused by more than one operators. EU Member States shall opt for 
joint and several or proportionate liability. Another significant difference to be men-
tioned is that the ELD does not impose retroactive liability, while both US statutes 
do.
148
 As far as exemptions from liability are concerned, the US legislation includes on-
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ly a few, such as act of God, act of war, or act or omission of a third party unrelated to 
the defendant and an innocent purchaser defense.
149
  
Another element worth to be mentioned is that the European Directive seems to adopt 
the US notion of the public trustee by empowering the competent authorities to prevent 
and remedy environmental damage.
150
 A principal difference is that under the ELD 
competent authorities are not obliged, but only required to take the necessary remedial 
measures in case that the liable operator cannot be found or is financially incapable of 
paying the costs of his pollution. On the contrary, in the US it seems that environmental 
damage hardly is left unabated, even in case of orphan damages.
151
 
A significant difference between the US and EU legislations regarding environmental 
damage assessment is that in the US all types of environmental damage are treated in 
the same way. On the contrary, the ELD in case of land damage does not request resto-
ration to its baseline condition, but only the removal of the contaminants from the soil, 
so that the damage no longer poses a significant risk to human health.
152
  
Another point to be noted is that under all US natural resource damages statutes, the 
minimum measure of damage is normally the cost of restoring the injured site or acquir-
ing equivalent resources. However, this principal rule was not directly accepted under 
CERCLA. According to this rule, there are four types of action describing the procedure 
of the recoverable costs. Firstly, the return of the site to its baseline condition is re-
quired. Similarly, the ELD refers to this procedure as primary restoration. Secondly, 
creating or improving the condition of an alternative site, namely of a resource of the 
same type, which is geographically linked to the injured site or replacing an injured re-
source with a substitute resource at the injured site. Respectively, similar provisions are 
included in the ELD regarding the complementary remediation. Lastly, acquiring simi-
lar resources for purposes such as parks and wildlife refuges in order to protect them or 
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provide public access. Trustees are free to choose any of these actions, without being 
obliged to follow an order of priority defined by law.
153
  
2.2.4 Access to environmental justice 
In the US citizens are entitled to intervene in government decisions, but also have ac-
cess to the courts against the authorities.
154
 CERCLA authorizes “any person” who falls 
into either of two categories defined in section 310 to bring actions against state’s statu-
tory duties. Citizen suits
155
 constitute an important provision both of CERCLA and 
OPA, as they enforce statutory requirements applicable to government agencies which 
perform clean-up actions, often referred to in case law as “mandatory duties”. However, 
this provision seems to be a broad grant to trustee agencies and contain a little action 
that could be enforceable by citizens against trustees.
156
 
Under the ELD, competent authorities have the predominant role in the implementation 
of the provisions of the Directive, however, Article 12 entitles natural or legal persons 
which fall into either of three categories
157
 defined in Article 12 (1), to “submit to the 
competent authority any observations relating to instances of environmental damage or 
an imminent threat of such damage of which they are aware and shall be entitled to re-
quest the competent authority to take action under this Directive”.  The provisions of 
Article 12 empower non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which are considered to 
fulfill the two of the three criteria set in paragraph (1) of the same Article, to promote 
environmental protection. In addition, Article 13 foresees access to the court for third 
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persons defined in Article 12; this decision εleads to Europeanization of domestic sys-
tems of environmental public interest litigation.
 158
  
2.3 Further analysis of the ELD, emphasizing the scholarly criticism on efficiency 
aspects 
2.3.1 Insolvency and inefficient provisions upon financial quarantees 
The problem of insolvency of the polluting firm arises when the cost of the damage oc-
curred is higher than the assets of the firm. As a result, under-compensation of the vic-
tims might arise. Furthermore, it might also be possible that a limitation of the compen-
sation is included in the liability legislation, which is called “financial cap”159. In both 
cases, under a strict liability regime, underdeterrence might arise.
160
 Therefore, from an 
economic perspective strict liability regime should not be introduced without financial 
guarantees, as insolvency risk might arise and consequently, the restoration of environ-
mental damage cannot be insured.
161
 On the contrary, under a negligence rule the insol-
vency problem is not that intense. The reason why, is that the polluter will still have an 
incentive to take the optimal care, as long as the costs of these precaution measures are 
less than the value of his assets.
162
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Article 14 of the ELD provides that Member States shall take measures to encourage the 
development of financial security instruments and markets by the appropriate economic 
and financial operators, including financial mechanisms in case of insolvency, with the 
aim of enabling operators to use financial guarantees for covering their responsibilities 
under this Directive.
163
 However, mandatory insurance is not required by Member 
States. From an economic point of view, it is regrettable that the Directive does not pro-
vide for a certain kind of financial insurance among the Member States yet. Neverthe-
less, Article 8 (2) which foresees financial guarantees as via security over propertyfor 
coverage of costs made by authorities might be capable of compensating this deficit in 
case of an insolvency of operators who have caused the damage or the imminent threat 
of damage at least to some extent.
164
 
Some national environmental insurance markets have been created, whereby a variation 
among the States is obvious, as the provisions of the Directive are not binding regarding 
financial insurance.
165
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 The following figure (Figure 2) demonstrates the national environmental insurance markets of 
some indicative Member States, as it was formulated by 2009. A notable observation is that only 
Germany achieved to proceed to an advanced insurance market only two years after the deadline for 
the transposition of the ELD to the Member States. Note that the countries referred in the figure are 
indicative, as they are only those who took part in the below mentioned survey. 
 
Figure 2. MS assessment of their national environmental insurance market165 
 
Source: T. Munchmeyer, V. Fogleman, L. Mazza, and S.Mudgal. Implementation Effectiveness of 
the Environmental Liability Directive (ELD) and related Financial Security Issues. Bio Intelligence 
Service, Report for the European Commission (DG Environment), 2009, p.52. 
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Still limited action seems to have been taken regarding insurance issues with only eight 
Member States having adopted mandatory financial security provisions.
166
 Other Mem-
ber States,
167
 rely on voluntarily financial security.
168
 According to the report of the Eu-
ropean Commission in 2010, on the effectiveness of the Directive in terms of actual re-
mediation of environmental damages examining whether the liability regime should be 
modified
169
, which was submitted according to Article 14 of the ELD, the action the 
Member States took is restricted to discussions with insurers. In most cases the national 
insurance markets are developed at the insurers’ initiative.170 
2.3.2 Compulsory Insurance 
Compulsory insurance might be a solution to the underdeterrence problem. The duty of 
a polluter to purchase liability insurance would be a good way to protect victims against 
the insolvency of the injurer. Obligatory insurance can prove to be beneficial, as it re-
moves the risk from risk-averse persons and thus increases their utility.
171
  Mandatory 
insurance might assure the implementation of the polluter pays principle, as the liable 
operator will pay the costs of remediating any environmental damage. However, com-
pulsory insurance might have optimal results only if certain circumstances are avoided. 
For instance, control of moral hazard, competitiveness of insurance markets and ade-
quate information are some conditions that have to be met. 
More specifically, moral hazard is the well-known phenomenon according to which the 
insured polluter changes his behavior as soon as the risk is removed from him. In other 
words, the polluter seems to have no incentive for care taking, as with insurance the risk 
is shift from him to the insurer, who will pay the compensation as well. Faure points out 
three possible ways in order to control moral hazard. The first one is through monitoring 
of the insured, the second one through exposing the insured partially to risk and lastly, a 
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combination of both methods.
172
 Monitoring of the insured seems to prevail though. In 
order to control moral hazard insurance providers can require that firms invest in a pre-
scribed level of preventive measures. In this way, the insured operators are forced to 
internalize the costs of their liabilities, since insurance premiums are priced such that 
they reflect the liability risk that the polluter poses.
173
 The confrontation of the moral 
hazard is considered to be of great significance, as in the contrary case compulsory in-
surance proves to be problematic, due to a potential externalization of pollution costs. 
It is crucial to be mentioned that the polluter in order to shift the risk from him to the 
insurer is charged a price or else fair premium. This is defined by the multiplication of 
the possibility that a certain event will occur with the possible magnitude of the dam-
age.
174
 Of course, this estimation requires accurate information on the likelihood that a 
certain loss will occur, as well as the potential magnitude of the damage. However, the 
predictability of liability risk is often difficult to be estimated. Therefore, the injurer is 
charged with an additional premium the so- called risk premium, to account for this un-
predictability. However, the final premium might be attractive or not for the parties in-
volved. Compulsory insurance generally neglects the fact that the demand for insurance 
may vary according to the individual risk situation, which constitutes a significant omis-
sion.
175
 
Another condition for the successful function of the obligatory insurance is the competi-
tiveness of the insurance markets. With the existence of competition the premiums will 
be adjusted optimally among individuals. Nevertheless, in many countries monopolistic 
situations prevail, where it is more difficult to control moral hazard problem, thus the 
outcomes are not characterized by optimality. 
Environmental insurance markets are not an experienced branch, as they have been late-
ly introduced. The limited availability of insurance cover for this branch is to a large 
extent caused by the adverse selection problem; since a minority of companies seeks for 
insurance, an optimal risk spreading is not possible.
176
 A remedy for adverse selection 
problem, as well as moral hazard is risk differentiation. 
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However, according to Faure, it is ambiguous whether the existing insurance firms are 
able to differentiate environmental liability risks effectively and control moral hazard 
problem. In other words, it becomes dependent upon insurers whether they are willing 
and have the ability to cover a certain risk. Therefore, the implementation of compulso-
ry insurance has triggered controversy among Member States. 
 On the other hand, according to an overall assessment of the ELD-related insurance 
market in 2009, the market was described as growing and competitive, that provides 
good cover for most liabilities under the Directive. The impediment to the growth of 
this market is not deemed to be the amount of premiums neither the uninsurability of 
certain risks, but rather the lack of interest from the operators for this certain risk.
177
 
According to the same study, clear guidelines and models are necessary in order to fa-
cilitate insurance product development for insurance market, elements which are still 
restricted to national efforts and might not be applicable to other Member States. 
A notable observation worth to be mentioned is the wide range of alternative financial 
security instruments that are suitable to cover the ELD-related liabilities. However, 
there is limited knowledge to the Member States and the operators regarding this issue. 
Surety bonds, letters of credit and trust funds are only some of the alternative financial 
instruments available in the market. They provide incentives to the operator an soon as 
the charges are according to his specificities. The selection of the appropriate instrument 
for each occasion has to be based on the individual particularities of each operator, 
though these alternatives to insurance are considered to be suitable for large polluting 
firms rather than small-medium enterprises (SMEs). In addition, their implementation is 
further limited in times of economic crisis.
178
 The main limitations of financial security 
products are the exclusion of gradual environmental damage
179
 and exclusion for some 
types of remediation, such as compensatory. These limitations exist due mainly to lack 
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of data regarding ELD cases and technical support in assessment of losses. As this kind 
of markets become more experienced, these limitations will be resolved.  
According to the report of the European Commission in 2010, the most well-known and 
often used instrument is insurance. Other instruments also used in the EU are bank 
guarantees (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain 
and UK), funds and bonds (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Poland and Spain) and 
insurance pools (Spain, France and Italy).
180
  
2.3.3 Comparison with US legislation 
The ELD does not oblige Member States to establish any sort of obligatory insurance or 
financial security in general, as the Superfund in CERCLA.
181
 According to the provi-
sions of the European liability regime, in case “an operator fails to comply with his ob-
ligations, cannot be identified or is not required to bear the costs under this Directive, 
the competent authority may take these measures itself, as a means of last resort”182. 
The Directive does encourage the development of such financial security, but it does not 
include mandatory financial security in its provisions. Hence, it is left upon the choice 
of the Member States whether they will impose a financial security system or not. Thus, 
liability varies significantly among Member States.
183
 This wide range of different 
schemes across the EU could lead to a distortion of competition, as operator could 
choose the countries with the weakest or none insurance standards in order to carry out 
their activities.
184
 
The European Commission as well as the EU Member States could learn from the expe-
rience of financial security in the US. On the contrary, financial security provisions for 
environmental liability have been established in the US for over 20 years. The Super-
fund program has been implemented and enforced financial security regarding the 
clean-up costs of injured sites. In addition, the Act provides for financial responsibility 
assurance by polluting firms, setting aside surety bonds or designated funds.
185
 Howev-
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er, some deficiencies have been observed regarding the financial security in the US. 
These refer to the clean-up costs that were finally borne by tax payers, because the at-
risk firms failed to cope with the increased costs of remediating environmental dam-
age.
186
      
2.3.4 Causation 
The economic approach to causation
187
 is based on the fact that the injurer- polluter 
should be held liable only for the damage he caused.
 188
  However, it is often hard to es-
tablish a verifiable causal relationship between the damage and the activity related in 
case of environmental pollution. Key difficulties in enforcing environmental liability 
emanates from the existence of causal uncertainty.
189
 Law is called to solve this prob-
lem. In a situation of uncertain causation, whether a polluter can be held liable depends 
crucially on the procedural rules regarding the burden of proof. The question of who 
should be assigned the burden of proof entails substantial incentive effects, which have 
been collaborated in following scholars’ approaches.190  
According to Van den Bergh, causal uncertainty can stem from two different situa-
tions.
191
 In the first one there are uncertain victims, whereas in the second one multiple 
injurers. In other words, in the first situation the damage may have multiple causes, thus 
it is not clear whether it has occurred due to a single operator only or due to another 
cause. In the latter situation, it is difficult to be defined which operator has causal rela-
tionship with a particular victim. 
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Much of the bibliography emphasizes to the so- called “probability of causation”, the 
determination of which can be deemed a fundamental in order to limit the causal uncer-
tainty. Some authors claim that the causation should be equal to the objective marginal 
product of an activity, being the amount in which the activity has contributed to an in-
crease in the accident risk, although this is difficult to be achieved in practice. In other 
words, on the basis of statistical evidence the plaintiff should not be liable for the back-
ground risk, namely the existing risk, but only for the excess risk, namely the additional 
risk.
192
 
In order to deal with causal uncertainty, Shavell distinguishes three fundamental legal 
rules, an all-or-nothing rule, a threshold liability rule and a proportional liability rule.
193
 
An all-or-nothing criterion holds that either there is not liability or in case there is liabil-
ity, then full compensation for the victim is provided. A threshold liability rule is actual-
ly a modified version of all-or-nothing rule. Under this rule, a certain threshold is set by 
law regarding the probability that the damage was caused by the injurer. If this probabil-
ity is higher than this threshold, then compensation is rewarded. However, when the 
probability of causation falls under the threshold, then the diminished burden of liability 
leads to reduced care taken by the operator. On the other hand, when the probability ex-
ceeds the threshold, operator will face an extra burden, thus he will invest too much in 
care. Hence, threshold liability rule cannot generate politically desired incentives in 
terms of efficient environmental protection. Under a proportional liability rule, the 
probability of causing the damage is expressed as a right to claim compensation propor-
tional to the damage. In respect of both the injurers and the victims this rule seems to be 
preferable, as the injurer is required to compensate only for the proportion of the dam-
age he caused and the victim receives compensation if the causality with the damage is 
proven. Hence, from an economic point of view, the majority of the authors agree that 
the proportional liability rule is most efficient and results in socially ideal behavior.
194
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Tort law tends to follow such approaches that protect the victim, with respect to causa-
tion uncertainty.
195
 This means that in some cases full scientific proof of causal relation-
ship is not demanded from the victim, whereas in other cases a reversal burden of proof 
occurs. Another approach which is used in case of uncertainty due to multiple injurers is 
to hold several tortfeasors jointly and severally liable.  
A far as the Liability Directive is concerned, it could be characterized rather vague re-
garding causation; however, causality requirement can be deducted from its scope.
196
 
Article 3 states that in order for the liability regime to apply, a link between the envi-
ronmental damage or imminent threat of such damage and the occupational activities of 
the Annex is necessary. Furthermore, Article 4 (5) is the only point of the Directive 
where it is clearly stated that in case of diffuse pollution, a causal link between the dam-
age and the activities of individual operators is necessary. In case of a multiple party 
causation, Member States are responsible to decide the cost of remedying that dam-
age.
197
 Nevertheless, there is no reference regarding causation requirement in the provi-
sions for preventive and remedial measures, although it can be deducted from the gen-
eral notion and the scope of the Directive. As many other matters, the Directive gives 
freedom to the Member States on whether they will adopt more stringent provisions re-
garding the prevention and remedying of environmental damage.
198
 
2.3.5 Causality and Insurance 
From an economic point of view, shifting the risk of causal uncertainty or a reversal of 
the burden of proof to the injurer might have negative consequences for the insurability 
of risks.
199
 Precisely, as the risk is shifted to the injurers, it is indirectly shifted to the 
insurers as well. Hence, a polluter might be required to compensate a victim fully for a 
damage for which he/she was not fully responsible himself/ herself. However, under a 
proportionality rule the insured firm will only compensate for the damage it actually 
caused. Generally speaking, the tendency to provide protection to the victim through the 
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approaches described proves to be more problematic than the shift towards strict liabil-
ity.
200
  
2.3.6 Retroactivity 
In environmental liability there is often observed a time lapse between the negative en-
vironmental outcome and the time that the damage occurred. This might emanates from 
the fact that the risks of the damage are not always fully recognized, due to lack of sci-
entific knowledge at the time of the damage, for instance. This fact has triggered a de-
bate on whether liability rules should be applied in a retroactive manner or not, because 
a retroactive application of liability rules seems to contradict to the impact of these rules 
efficiency terms.
 201
 
 
As far as the ELD is concerned, it does not have a retroactive ef-
fect, as it is applicable only to damage occurred after a certain time threshold, defined to 
be 30April 2007.
 202
 In case that retroactivity is applied, a polluter is held liable for 
damage that occurred in the past, which was not considered wrongful given the availa-
ble scientific information at that time. However, in this way wrong incentives regarding 
damage prevention are provided to the polluter, as retroactivity does not follow the cor-
nerstone of tort law, which is providing incentives to the polluter in order to prevent 
damage from occurring or remedy the damage if it eventually occurs. In other words, a 
foresight for ex post liability gives incentives for ex ante taking preventive action.
203
 
Furthermore, from an economic perspective, the investment on care taken before the 
damage occurred is considered to be a “sunk cost”204, which have already been occurred 
and cannot be recovered. Sunk costs are retrospective costs, thus the fact that care was 
not taken in a sufficient level cannot change. 
More importantly, new risks usually emerge with time, thus due care standard should 
also be adapted. For instance, technological improvement might cause an increase in 
care standard. Therefore information about new risks or else development risks is 
deemed to be crucial. According this and regarding to Faure, a liability regime on de-
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velopment risks could be efficient, as it could generate incentives to the operators to 
seek information about new risk and thus preventing environmental damage.
205
  
Hence, the Directive follows the economic analysis of tort law and proves to be efficient 
regarding retroactivity. However, according to Article 16 the final decision for more 
stringent measures is left again upon the Member States.  
2.3.7 Extensive introduction of defenses  
As it is already mentioned, the ELD provides for two kinds of defenses available to the 
polluters: the permit defense and the state-of-the-art-defense, as described in Article 8 
(4) of the Directive. A more thorough analysis is deemed necessary in view of the im-
portance of the defenses from an economic analysis standpoint 
2.3.8 Operation in compliance with an administrative permit  
The question regarding compliance in the context of a permit defense is activated when 
the operator demonstrates that he is not negligent, hence has taken the due care 
measures, as the environmental damage is caused by “an emission or event expressly 
authorized by and fully in accordance with the conditions of, an authorization conferred 
by or given under applicable national laws and regulations which implement the EU Di-
rectives that are listed in Annex III.
206
  
The introduction of a regulatory compliance defense in the Directive has triggered con-
troversy among scholars. Some reasons why, are successfully scrutinized by Kristel De 
Smedt;
207
 Here, a short overview will be demonstrated. To start with, a complete permit 
defense does not give incentives to the polluter to take precaution in excess of the regu-
latory standard. Thus, it is considered that it provides minimal protection for environ-
mental damage.
 208
 One characteristic that triggers ambiguity over the permit defense is 
the difficulty in obtaining information about the determination of the due care level. For 
industries it is easier to obtain the necessary information rather than courts, but usually 
there are no incentives for them to do so. In addition, permit defense triggers impartiali-
ty issues, as regulators in legal (administrative) and/or political procedures are often un-
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der pressure and lobbying from several interest groups during the decision- making pro-
cess. For the above reasons mentioned, the economic theory on tort law indicates that a 
regulatory compliance defense is counterproductive; thus, for several scholars the per-
mit defense might undermine the ability of the Directive to ensure prevention and resto-
ration of environmental damage. On the other hand, Bergkamp argues that without a 
permit defense inefficiency would occur, as the polluter would be charged twice: once 
to comply with the care standard and once for the damage caused despite the measures 
he took.
209
 On the contrary, environmental groups are opponents to the permit defense, 
as they claim that polluters can be easily exempted from liability, which opposes to the 
polluter- pays principle. However, defenses of Article 8 have been characterized as a 
“mitigating factors” clause, which aims at reducing compensation payable by polluting 
firms.
210
 Moreover, in cases that permit defense exempts operators from restoration of 
the damage, the Directive lays responsible the Member States for the clean-up of the 
damage, the implementation of which entails obstacles and leads to ambiguity though. 
From another point of view, Article 8 (4) of the Directive includes a rather narrow de-
fense, as the burden of proof lays with the operator. In other words, it is the operator, 
who has to prove that the damage caused was not due to his activity. 
2.3.9 Operation in compliance with the state-of-the-art 
Article 8 (4) also defines the state-of-the-art defense, which constitutes an exemption 
from liability when the operator proves that his activities were not considered to cause 
environmental harm, given the scientific information available at the time that the dam-
age occurred. Precisely, as pointed out in paragraph (b) the state-of-the-art defense is 
activated when “an emission or an activity or any manner of using a product in the 
course of an activity which the operator demonstrates was not considered likely to cause 
environmental damage according to the state of scientific and technical knowledge at 
the time when the emission was released or the activity took place”. 
Similarly with the regulatory compliance defense, the Directive leaves to Member 
States the final choice upon including this defense into national laws. In addition, also 
in this case the Directive did not succeed in drafting an exception being in line with an 
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economic analysis approach. As it is already analyzed,
211
 liability for development risk 
might give incentives to the operator to obtain information on new risks and the optimal 
precautionary measures that might be taken to prevent the risk, as soon as it does not 
turn into a retro-active liability regime. However, Article 8 of the Directive exempts the 
operator from liability for development risk, which might lead to inefficient out-
comes.
212
  
2.3.10 Transposition of the ELD 
The deadline for the transposition of the ELD to the Member States was set on 30 April 
2007, though transposition of the ELD was completed by the last Member State not be-
fore July 2010.
213
 Existing national legislation had to be adjusted and developed accord-
ing to the provisions of the Directive, a procedure which delayed in some Member 
States. Therefore, little practical experience is available regarding the implementation of 
the liability regime among the Member States. As it is already underlined, ELD gives 
the option to the Member States to decide whether they will impose stricter liability leg-
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Table 1. ELD defense options in MS transpositions 
 
 
 Source: T. Munchmeyer, V.Fogleman, L. Mazza, and S. Mudgal (2009), p.27. 
213
 The Environmental Liability Directive: An effective tool for its purpose?, Comparative study on 
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islation. Hence, some differences are observed in the implementation of the Directive 
among the States, mainly regarding the defense options and financial security issues. 
The mechanism for transposing the ELD varies widely among Member States. In some 
States the legislative transposition procedures are lengthy and complicated whereas in 
others it are shorter and more simple.
214
 In addition, the imprecise language of the Di-
rective in some provisions has lead to a variety of interpretations by Member States. For 
instance, some cases reported refer to ambiguity over the definition of “operator”, 
“permit defense” and “natural resource services”.215 
As it is observed in the statistical analysis that follows (Figure 3), which is based on the 
results of the Member States consultation, there is variety of options provided for the 
Directive that Member States decided to implement in their national legislation. The 
majority of Member States have extended the biodiversity scope beyond what the Di-
rective foresees. Only the minority of the States has adopted strict liability for non An-
nex III activities and mandatory financial security. A notable feature worth to mention 
is the absence of state-of-the-art and/or permit defense from some national legislations. 
However, as it is already noted, according to the final report of the Commission in No-
vember 2009 many states had already accepted both defenses in their legislation.
216
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Figure 3. National transposition features
217
 
2.4 Proposals for an efficient liability regime 
The implementation of the ELD is hindered by some fundamental obstacles, which have 
to be surpassed in order for an effective application of the Directive across the Member 
States to be realized.  
The variation of the national legislations and the different interpretations that Member 
States have attributed to several provisions of the Directive create difficulties in the im-
plementation of the ELD. Therefore, interpretation guidance to the competent authori-
ties and the operators as well would be necessary in order for some definitions and is-
sues that the Directive could be characterized as vague or confusing. Some key defini-
tions and concepts which need further explanation include for instance, “environmental 
damage”, “significant damage”, and “baseline condition”. The interpretation support 
could be realized through informative documents, workshops, seminars or online sup-
port through expertise websites.  
Moreover, the fact that many Member States did not follow the three-year transposition 
deadline set by the Directive, but prolonged the transpositions period, has as a result the 
existence of limited ELD cases to be taken as examples and consequently, stakehold-
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ers
218
 are unaware of the ELD cases identified and are often unaware of their legal obli-
gations and rights too. Thus, raising awareness efforts as well as recording of the ELD 
cases is crucial to be realized. Raising awareness actions include conferences, seminars, 
informative documents and information through special websites. Furthermore, Member 
States should keep records of ELD cases, which can be used as experience on how in 
terms of best practices to apply the Directive and support the stakeholders. Online sub-
mission systems for the notification of cases of environmental damages are already 
available in some Member States. In addition, technical support to the competent au-
thorities especially regarding the economic valuation techniques, are of high im-
portance. 
Financial security sector is also characterized of unawareness by both competent author-
ities and operators. Another problem this sector faces is that divergent national transpos-
ing rules have created difficulties in the implementation of financial security. This wide 
range of different schemes across the EU could lead to a distortion of competition, as 
operators could choose the countries with the weakest or none insurance standards in 
order to carry out their activities.
219
 In addition, financial security providers have to 
modify their insurance products in order to fit to the requirements of each Member 
State. The unawareness of stakeholders regarding insurance issues deteriorates the ef-
fective implementation of financial security. Therefore, tools and measures that promote 
information exchange and communication among stakeholders will facilitate the im-
plementation of the Directive.
220
 Regarding natural resource damage assessment, pro-
posals will be submitted in a separate chapter of this study with means of a comparative 
analysis of Annex II and US normatively established assessment techniques. 
2.5 Conclusions 
The ELD aims at the prevention and remediation of environmental damages and it is 
featured by the polluter-pays principle. The Directive establishes a liability system in 
the form of administrative mechanisms, thus deserves to include the term “liability”. 
The Directive establishes only a form of minimum protection for the environment and it 
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is left upon the Member States whether they will adopt more stringent provisions or not. 
Thus, ELD is perceived to have a narrow scope of application with many optional pro-
visions regarding significant issues such as the scope of biodiversity, the mandatory fi-
nancial security and defenses from liability, which are left upon the discretion of Mem-
ber States. Moreover, some significant definitions and issues are described with vague 
wording, which generates confusion and difficulties in the implementation of the Di-
rective. ELD does not aim at harmonizing fully national legislations, hence there is a 
variety on the provisions of the Directive that Member States decided to transpose to 
their national laws. Of course, the transposition and implementation of the Directive en-
countered obstacles, the most important of which were the integration to national laws, 
the uncertainties in the text of the Directive and the fact that several issues are left in the 
discretion of the Member States. In order for the ambiguity regarding whether the ELD 
is an effective liability regime to be dissolved, some guidance to the Member States, as 
well as informative and supportive measures for several significant issues of the ELD 
shall be consolidated.  
The US legislature has consolidated two fundamental environmental damage statutes in 
order to deal with the contamination of natural resources. The US legislation seems to 
outmatch in the whole the European Directive, as it promotes a more circumstantial and 
accurate legislative frame. Many provisions of the ELD have been based on those of 
CERCLA and/or OPA, especially regarding issues for which the US disposes long time 
experience, such as financial security. However, the ELD covers a broader activity 
spectrum, while the US law is limited to the protection of natural resources from con-
tamination, for a wide range of natural resources though. Moreover, the US legislation 
is inferior to the ELD in that the US statutes are characterized by retroactivity, which is 
not in line with economic theory and it undermines the polluter-pays principle, on 
which both legislations are based. The ELD has also been influenced by the US notion 
of the public trustees by empowering the competent authorities to prevent and remedy 
environmental damages. Furthermore, wide access to courts is given to the NGOs. In 
the EU such power is mainly given to the NGOs, it is considered to be weaker though. 
Importantly, the US statutes provide for obligatory financial security for the polluters, 
unlike ELD. Regarding this issue, the EU has a lot to learn from the US long time expe-
rience. As far as the assessment of environmental damage is concerned, two approaches 
are included in the legislations, namely the restoration cost and the economic valuation 
techniques. The latter is used for the assessment of monetary compensation due to harm 
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to environmental goods that have no market price, which has triggered intense contro-
versy, as it will be indicated in the following chapter. 
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3 Efficiency considerations with respect to environmental damage valuation 
techniques in the basic relevant US statutes and perspectives for their utili-
zation by applying the ELD 
ELD provisions seem to have been based on the US legislation in respect to the NRDA 
regulations. This influence will be examined in this last Chapter of the thesis in order 
for present and future prospects of the most prevailing valuation techniques to be identi-
fied.  
3.1 NRDA regulations in the US 
NRDA is a normative regulation which incorporates some quantitative evaluation of 
injury to natural resources resulting from a discharge of oil or release of hazardous sub-
stances. These damages are compensable; to the enforcement of NRDA provisions sev-
eral of legislative authorities are competent.
221
  
Precisely, Ohio v U.S. Department of the Interior, of the Supreme Court of US, of 
1989
222
 has set the background for the estimation of cost in environmental damage as-
sessment, the compensability of non-use values as well as the recognition of Contingent 
Valuation as the prevailing though controversial method for valuing non-market envi-
ronmental goods and services. In the wake of Ohio decision, both CERCLA and OPA 
developed their provisions regarding valuation methods NRDA.
223
 The currently avail-
able NRDA regulations provide detailed procedures for conducting assessments; these 
are, however, not binding to Trustees.
224
 Although, Trustees tend to follow these regula-
tions in order to have a rebuttable presumption for the assessment. Two types of regula-
tions for NRDA procedures have been promulgated: Type A rules which apply to rela-
tively small loses and Type B rules which apply to more important incidents. A typical 
                                                 
221
 A. B. Shortelle, T. M. Slocum and J. L. Dudley (1993), NRDA- A sleeping giant?, 1993 Envi-
ronmental Conference, p. 739. 
222
 See 880 F. 2d 432, DC 1989. 
223
 R. J. Kopp and N. Schwarz, Determining the value of non-marketed goods: Economic, 
Psychologicaland Policy Relevant Aspects of Contingent Valuation Methods, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, p. 14-18. 
224
 P. Wetterstein (1997), p. 19. 
-54- 
NRDA process is conducted in four phases: Preassessment Screening, Preparation of an 
Assessment Plan, the Assessment Phase and a Post Assessment Phase.
225
  
Ohio affirmed a substantial portion of the original regulations promulgated by US De-
partment of Interior (DOI), however, some restrictive provisions such as the hierarchy 
of resource valuation measures and the “lesser-of” rule for measuring damages were 
reconsidered and finally rejected.
226
 To date, CERCLA provides for several valuation 
techniques, including contingent valuation, hedonic pricing and travel cost method and 
determines the suitable monetary method.
227
 Another significant provision to point out 
is that current regulations define the measure of damages as such, so as to include total 
lost value due to the injuries, including both use and non-use values.
228
 
OPA provides only some general directions regarding evaluation methodology, but it 
includes several references to service-to-service, resource-to-resource, value-to-cost and 
value-to-value methods.
229
 Unlike CERCLA, under OPA the selection of the most ap-
propriate valuation method is left to the discretion of the Trustee.
230
 
3.1.1 A brief comparison of NRDA regulations in the US and EU 
Two main approaches have been developed in the US statutes with the aim to evaluate 
natural resource damages: economic valuation techniques and the use of the cost of re-
placing an environmental service as a proxy for its value. Annex II of the ELD favors 
the second approach.
231
 In the US, the NOAA has developed an analytical tool, the so-
called Habitat Equivalency Analysis (HEA) in order to support the restoration cost ap-
proach.
232
 Annex II requires the use of resource-to-resource or service-to-service equiv-
alence approaches in order for the scale of complementary and compensatory remedial 
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measures to be determined. When it is not possible to implement these approaches, al-
ternative valuation techniques shall be used, such as monetary valuation.
233
 These pro-
visions seem to concur with the respective provisions of OPA. 
Both OPA and ELD require that when evaluating compensatory restoration, actions that 
provide natural resources and/or services of the same type, quality and quantity as those 
damaged shall be considered first. If compensatory actions of the same type and quality 
cannot provide a reasonable range of alternatives, then actions that provide natural re-
sources and services of comparable type and quality as those provided by the injured 
natural resources should be considered. After identifying the types of restoration actions 
that will be considered, the appropriate approach to determining the size of compensato-
ry restoration is to be defined. Note that the size of compensatory restoration should 
equal the value of interim losses due to the accident. The major approach for determin-
ing compensatory restoration according to the US and EU legislation is service-to-
service or resource-to-resource, which requires that the injured and restored site be of 
the same type, quality and comparable value, so as no explicit valuation to be neces-
sary.
234
 The cornerstone of this approach is that the extent of compensatory remediation 
should equal the value of interim losses, as shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Graphical Depiction of Service-to-Service Restoration Scaling
235
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When the injured and restored resources and services are not of the same type, quality 
and value, then valuation approach comes into force according to OPA provisions. This 
approach estimates the value of gains from the proposed restoration actions and the val-
ue of interim losses. Some well- known methods used to estimate these values are the 
travel-cost method, the hedonic price model and the contingent valuation (CV). The lat-
ter has been implemented broadly under CERCLA, as well as the Commission has ex-
pressed an interest in the use of CV method under the NOAA regulations.
236
 However, 
the ELD only foresees such methods in a general framework in its provisions.
237
 Annex 
II refers generally to monetary valuation for the determination of complementary and 
compensatory remedial measures, but it does not specify further the meaning of this 
clause. The operator and the competent authority might agree on the most appropriate 
method for assessing environmental damage, though it would be helpful to have some 
guidance on this issue. It is likely that Cost-benefit analysis (CBA), which features 
prominently in the literature regarding NRDA, will be a useful tool in order for Annex 
II provisions to be applied effectively in practice, though such a proposal is not included 
in the ELD.
238
 
The general goal of restoration, as specified by damage assessment regulations under 
CERCLA and OPA, is the return of the injured site to “baseline”, which is defined as 
“conditions that would have existed at the assessment area had the discharge of oil or 
the release of a hazardous substance under investigation not occurred”.239 Likewise, the 
ELD defines as such the goal of remediation, giving a similar definition for baseline 
conditions, however, its provisions are considered to be less restrictive, as it has intro-
duced the potentiality of compensatory restoration.
240
 Ιn terms of economic analysis, 
this provision promotes efficiency, as it can be used only when benefits exceed costs. 
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On the other hand, inefficiencies are possible, if lower restoration cost would have been 
suitable to completely compensate for the damage.
241
  
A far as the definition of interim losses are concerned, both US and EU legislations 
seem to concur.
242
 Figure 5 demonstrates two different options in order for a damaged 
natural resource to reach baseline level. The first path shows the situation in which ac-
tive primary restoration is taken. In this case, the benefit gained is shown in area B. Ar-
ea A demonstrates the interim loss which is realized due to the damage occurred and 
needs compensatory remediation. The second path shows the situation in which no pri-
mary remediation action is taken, thus more time is needed in order for the injured site 
to return to its baseline condition. In this case, area A and B represents the extent of the 
interim losses. 
 
 
Figure 5. Graphical Representation of Primary Restoration and Interim Losses
243
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Economic damages to the public for interim loss may include in addition to the costs of 
restoration, lost use values and lost non-use values or else passive values.
244
 The meas-
ure of damages under CERCLA and OPA includes the trustees’ reasonable assessment 
costs. Allowing the trustees to recover such costs and use the gain to perform other 
damage assessments, is extremely valuable to the development of an effective natural 
resource damages program.
245
 Under CERCLA, the compensable value is estimated 
with monetary assessment methods, without specific directions for the selection of the 
most appropriate valuation method though. In case that there is no impairment of use 
values, then contingent valuation method comes into force in order to estimate the non-
use values.
246
 
The use of contingent valuation method under CERCLA does not seem to lead to a fac-
tual reduction of the cost of compensatory restoration measures. Furthermore, the dis-
pute occurred due to their application might lead to inefficient outcomes. On the contra-
ry, OPA introduces a cooperative style for the determination of compensatory restora-
tion measures, which is an important fact especially in case of dispute. It is notable that 
under CERCLA, valuation techniques are used for the cost estimation, which it is not 
based on actual restoration costs. CERCLA does not provide for specific guidelines for 
the application of these techniques, it refers only to the implementation of cost-benefit 
analysis.
247
 On the other hand, OPA provides only optimal incentive effects for preven-
tion if monetary valuation is used ex ante for a natural resource. In this way though, 
OPA does not lead to a uniform valuation approach which boosts the prevention effects.  
 
As already stated, economic approach issues are distinguishable in Articles 2 and 16 
under the ELD. Annex II defines the preconditions for the implementation of monetary 
assessment methods, which come into force in order to estimate the value of impaired 
resources, which is necessary for the determination of compensatory remediation 
measures. According to Annex II (1.2.3) “if it is not possible to use the first choice re-
source-to-resource or service-to-service equivalence approaches, then alternative valua-
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tion techniques shall be used. The competent authority may prescribe the method, for 
example monetary valuation, to determine the extent of the necessary complementary 
and compensatory remedial measures. If valuation of the lost resources and/or services 
is practicable, but valuation of the replacement natural resources and/or services cannot 
be performed within a reasonable time-frame or at a reasonable cost, then the competent 
authority may choose remedial measures whose cost is equivalent to the estimated mon-
etary value of the lost natural resources and/or services”. Likewise OPA, the ELD fore-
sees that, in case of an irreversibly damaged natural resource there is not direct restitu-
tion for the loss occurred, but restitution of equivalent resources is required. A monetary 
valuation of damaged resources is possible, given that the assessment of losses and 
functions is feasible. However, the assessment of the surrogate of the resource does not 
seem to follow the rule of proportionality, which is a necessary precondition, as defined 
in the ELD.
248
 A significant observation worth to be mentioned is that Annex II 1.3.2 
states that “compensatory or complementary actions should provide a similar level of 
natural resources and/or services as those foregone”. From an economic point of view, 
this provision implies that the marginal benefit of restoration, the value of which is es-
timated in monetary terms, should be equal to the negative limit use which occurred due 
to the damage.  
Another significant observation worth to be highlighted is that the measure of damage is 
no longer the monetary value of the natural resources lost but the cost of compensatory 
restoration actions providing full compensation of interim losses in order to reduce 
transaction costs and to deflect some of the controversy about economic assessment 
methods that are explicitly authorized for determining the monetary value which usually 
lead to law disputes. 
3.2 Introducing the economic value of environmental damage 
Environmental resources are unpriced and they are not traded in markets, they do have 
value though. Economic theory designates the value of the environment in two senses: 
In the term of its direct impacts on utility to individuals and on production.
249
 In other 
words, the valuation of the environment can be realized through the “commodification” 
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of the environmental goods and services. These goods and services are treated as argu-
ments in utility and production functions respectively.
250
 
Environmental changes, namely changes in the quality and/or quantity of natural re-
sources have an impact on production. The reason why, is that many production pro-
cesses use as inputs environmental goods.  For instance, the annual production of a 
farmer’s crops is influenced by environmental factors such as changes in rainfall and 
temperature. The economic value of such changes can be estimated as the impacts on 
the future stream of profits of the environmental damage, namely the net value of out-
put.
251
 However, the present thesis focuses on the influence of the environment in the 
utility for the individuals in relation to their consuming behavior.   
Utility is the satisfaction an individual receives from consuming a good or service. The 
value of these goods is then measured by the utility they generate. However, individuals 
can get satisfaction by the environment as well, either directly or indirectly. In other 
words, a person can increase his utility by interacting with the environment. In case that 
the quality and/or the quantity of environmental resources change, the utility deriving 
from them will change too. For instance, if an oil spill pollutes the sea, the swimmers 
and the visitors of a nearby beach will be dissatisfied, thus utility deriving from the 
beach will be decreased. On the other hand, individuals can also gain satisfaction from 
the environment without necessarily getting in touch with it. For instance, some indi-
viduals get utility just by knowing that the environment is preserved, without being di-
rectly associated with it.  
Environmental values which depend on actual use of the environment are known as 
“use values”, whereas values that are not based on such an actual relationship are 
known as “non-use values”. In the first category accrue consumptive activities, such as 
hunting, but also non consumptive, such as birds watching. Another interpretation is 
that if an individual uses one of his senses to experience a natural resource, he has actu-
ally used it. On the other hand, “non use value”252 demonstrates the worth of the natural 
resource beyond its “use value”. Tietenberg decomposes “non use value” in two catego-
ries. The first one is the “bequest value”, which shows the willingness to pay in order to 
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ensure that a resource is available for future generations. The second one is the “exist-
ence value”, which is considered the pure nonuse value and is measured by the willing-
ness to pay for the preservation of the environment, though without any interest for fu-
ture use by the payer. Given that nonuse values derive from motivations other than per-
sonal use, they are less tangible than use values.
253
 Both use and nonuse values compose 
the total economic value (TEV).
254
 
As long as the satisfaction or the well- being an individual gets from a natural resource 
is affected positively or negatively, for instance by an environmental externality, there 
is a value that follows this increase or decrease of well- being. This value is necessary to 
be estimated, though putting monetary value on this kind of resources is characterized 
by high difficulty. As it is already mentioned, a change in the quality and in some cases 
in the quantity of natural resources will change the value of these resources, which im-
plies economic costs. More specifically, deterioration in the environmental quality, due 
to an oil spill for instance, will change the economic value of the natural resource and 
will create economic costs. However, since many of these costs do not have a market 
value, special non-market valuation techniques are necessary in order to estimate 
them.
255
  
  As it is indicated in Chapter 1, the value of a good or service, which is reflected in its 
price, shows how much the consumers are willing to pay in order to acquire it or not to 
lose it and it equals to the marginal utility they get from consuming this good or service. 
For instance, the economic value of an increase in air quality in a city is given by the 
maximum that residents are willing to pay in order to live in a clearer atmosphere. Al-
ternatively, the residents are willing to accept a minimum compensation in order to bear 
a polluted atmosphere, for instance from a nearby power plant. Willingness to pay 
(WTP) and Willingness to accept (WTA) are the two main proxies used to measure en-
vironmental value. 
Values that are not traded in a market system might be difficult and costly to be esti-
mated. The reason why is the unfamiliarity with price estimation of such kind of goods 
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and services, as well as that many of these values manifest themselves only as emotions 
or intellectual conclusions. However, in the YS American tort law system there is great 
experience in assessing the value of nonmarket damages suffered by plaintiffs. From an 
economic point of view, a complete damage award promotes efficiency through deter-
ring undesirable behavior by involved parties in environmental damages.
256
  
3.2.1 Why valuing the environment? 
The belief that the environment has a value that goes beyond its utilitarian value is quite 
consistent with modern economic valuation techniques. Through these techniques it is 
possible for both the use and nonuse values to be estimated. This estimation is based on 
human preferences; This fact that this kind of valuation is based on human preferences 
has triggered great controversy. On the one hand, some ecologists debate with convinc-
ing arguments that allowing humans to determine the value of other species raises 
doubts regarding moral issues. On the other hand, proponents of valuation techniques 
stress that if humans do not put a value on the environment, then a default value of zero 
will be assigned in the estimations designed for public policies, which will lead to envi-
ronmental degradation.
257
  
On the other hand, the argument in favor of environmental protection is based on the 
fact that the environment has “intrinsic value”, which is independent of the human in-
terests. This value comes in contradiction to the “instrumental value”, the aforemen-
tioned value of the environment which derives from its usefulness to humans.
258
 The 
definition of the “intrinsic value” of the environment remains elusive, as it incorporates 
elements which are defined by their importance in relation to the ecosystem.
259
 Given 
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that the intrinsic value incorporates human preferences, it cannot be encompassed in the 
total economic value. However, notions of intrinsic value might influence WTP of indi-
viduals.
260
 Therefore, economic valuation is considered a way to demonstrate the signif-
icant value of the environment to society. 
3.3 Cost- benefit analysis (CBA) 
CBA is widely used for decision making and policy design. It is based on the idea of 
environmental externalities and through various techniques it can be applied on envi-
ronmental issues. CBA is based on the notion of human preferences, which are intimate-
ly connected to utility or well being to humans. More specifically, it provides rules for 
aggregating preferences so that it enables a “social preference” for or against an in our 
context environmentally relevant issue. Individual preferences are revealed through 
choices in the market place, through decisions to spend or not money.  
The CBA approach, instrumentalised in the context of the present study, weighs up the 
profits of the polluter against the damage done to the environment.
261
 In order for a pol-
luter’s activity to be efficient, profits should exceed damage.262 Profits or benefits are 
defined as increases in utility or well being and damages or costs as reductions in utility. 
CBA valuation process is the same for both benefits and costs, which are measured in 
monetary terms. The money values of both reflect human preferences as expressed 
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, where (1+s)-t is the so-called discount factor. Through discounting, one unit of future costs and 
benefits are weighted less than the same unit of present costs and benefits. Discounting has been 
developed by economists due to the notion that 1€ today worth more than 1€ tomorrow, even in the 
absence of inflation.   
This formula is also known as net present value (NPV), as it estimates the benefits net of costs and 
in present time. The basic decision rule for a project or policy to be accepted as an efficient one is 
that NPV should have a positive value, namely the present value of benefits must exceed the present 
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the calculation of NPV to be achieved, the discount factor is held constant and inflation is considered 
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through willingness to pay.
263
 Hence, CBA valuation is inextricably linked to WTP and 
WTA. 
These notions are grounded in the theory of welfare economics. According to economic 
theory, these values should be almost equal, though in practice they diverge with WTA 
to exceed often WTP. Diagrammatically WTP and WTA can be demonstrated as con-
sumer and producer surplus respectively.
264
 For goods and services that are bought and 
sold in the marketplace, the estimation of these values is based on market prices. How-
ever, the estimation of these values for nonmarket goods and services demand the ex-
amination of the behavior of the individuals. The fact that CBA is based on individuals’ 
intentions and not on their actual behavior constitutes the main concern of opponents of 
CBA. More specifically, WTP and WTA might differ in practice, often in a large 
amount. An explanation to this is that WTP is restricted by income, whereas WTA is 
not. Furthermore, individuals tend to value losses more highly than equivalent gains. 
This implies that a choice should be made between WTP and WTA for each incident 
occurred. This choice is influenced by property rights which accrue to the involved par-
ties. For instance, in case of a prospective environmental loss, if individuals have the 
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Demand depends on WTP and supply on WTA, so that the interaction of both in producing a market 
price provides a measure of value for goods and services. Indicatively, WTP is the area under the 
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right to enjoy the pre-loss level of environmental quality, then WTA should be meas-
ured. Alternatively, if they have no such right, WTP measures should be sought.
265
    
Cost-benefit analysis has triggered intense controversy among scholars. There are some 
impediments which have to be overcome in order for CBA to gain further acceptance. 
The problem areas are identified in respect to the robustness of value estimates, the 
transferability of value estimates, property rights and some ethical issues.  
3.4 Valuation techniques 
The valuation of environmental, nonmarket goods can be achieved with several tech-
niques available, which are divided into two main categories: stated preferences meth-
ods, which are also known as direct methods and revealed or indirect preferences meth-
ods, as shown in the following figure. The former are survey based methods, in which 
individuals are asked directly about their maximum WTP or minimum WTA by using 
principally questionnaires. More specifically, respondents are required to put a price to 
different levels of the nonmarket goods or to rank different scenarios. Finally, valua-
tions are estimated on individuals’ responses. The most common techniques which fall 
into this category are Contingent Valuation and Choice Experiments. In Revealed Pref-
erences methods researchers seek to uncover economic values for the environment by 
deliberating actual behavior in related markets. The most common techniques of this 
category are Hedonic Price and Travel Cost methods. Revealed preferences methods 
can estimate only use values, as they are based on actual behaviors, while stated prefer-
ences methods could estimate nonuse values, as they are based on individuals’ inten-
tions, while.
266
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Figure 6. Total Economic Value/ Valuation Methods
267
 
 
3.4.1 Stated Preferences Methods 
This category of valuation methods is also known as “Direct” methods, the most well-
known of which is Contingent Valuation (CV) and Choice Models (CM)
268
. However, 
bibliography has principally addressed the former technique, stressing in this way the 
significant role it holds in consolidating the assessment of use and non-use values in the 
US and EU. 
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3.4.2  Contingent Valuation (CV) 
One of the most widely used, but simultaneously the most controversial method for as-
sessing both use and non-use values, is the Contingent Valuation method. This term is 
actually used, as individuals are asked to declare their WTP or WTA contingent on a 
hypothetical scenario regarding an environmental service. This scenario includes a hy-
pothetical market for the nonmarket good, in which individuals can pay for the good in 
question.
269
 However, the fact that this method is not based on actual behavior, but on 
the individuals’ responses to hypothetical questions, has triggered constant debates in 
the economic literature, regarding the validity and reliability of the surveys’ results.270 
The application of the CV method is considered to be a complicated and expensive pro-
cess.  CV is a survey-based method, which is mainly conducted through personal inter-
views, direct or through telephone and e-mail surveys. In order to collect useful data 
and provide reliable results, the CV survey should be properly designed, pre-tested and 
implemented. As the results of the CV method are sensitive to individuals’ perception 
of the hypothetical concept, it is essential that the survey questions and the scenario de-
scribed be accurately defined.
271
 As stated previously, individuals are about to respond 
how much they would be willing to pay either to avoid a negative occurrence or to bring 
about a positive occurrence. The means of the payment or also known as payment vehi-
cles might include a direct tax, an income tax or an access fee. A question which is fre-
quently encountered during the survey is whether the respondents should be examined 
on their willingness to pay or to accept.
272
 Another issue that should be clearly de-
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scribed in the survey is the change of interest, in the form of increases or decreases of 
the quality and/or quantity of a specific environmental service.   
However, a number of factors might systematically bias respondents’ answers. Hypo-
thetical, information and strategic biases are the most common technical challenges that 
researchers come across.
273
 Another factor that might influence individuals’ final WTP 
response is the payment vehicle. Additionally, the fact that WTA usually exceeds WTP, 
as well as the fact that the CV method relies on individuals’ intentions and not actual 
behavior consist maybe the greatest weaknesses of this method. Nevertheless, the con-
stantly increasing studies that are devoted to CV method constitute a helpful back-
ground for a more accurate and reliable implementation of the technique.  
3.4.3 CV in the US 
Although controversial, CV method is widely used in the US during the last decades. 
This has been tied to the increasing use of CBA by Federal agencies, as the Executive 
Order issued by Reagan Administration required CBA on major regulations.
274
 The im-
plementation of CV method was especially boosted by a special Panel, which was ap-
pointed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in 1993 and 
was co-chaired by two well-known economists, K. Arrow and R. Solow. The Panel pre-
sented several guidelines on the design of CV studies for valuing non-use damages to 
natural resources.
275
 For instance, as far as the application procedure of the method is 
concerned, Arrow stresses that in-person or telephone interviews might lead to more 
reliable results than email surveys.
276
 In general, Arrow raised the standards to which 
CV studies undertaken for policy and damage assessments must meet. Furthermore, the 
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acceptance of CV for measuring non-use values, together with the guidelines available 
are expected to boost even more the implementation of CV method in the future.
277
   
To date, CV remains the prevailing technique available for the estimation of total eco-
nomic values. However, it is the most controversial method, as it raises concerns for its 
validity. Therefore, NOAA's panel recommended guidance to ensure reliability when 
using CV surveys to estimate passive use values. Kopp points out four categories of is-
sues which appear to be shaping the current and future debate over the 
inclusion of passive use values in the context of damage assessment and in the 
execution of cost-benefit analyses of the US federal regulatory programs.
278
 These in-
clude economic and legal issues, as well as business and political concerns. He also 
stresses that the fact that NOAA provides outstanding studies regarding the implementa-
tion of the CV and detailed guidelines, is a major effort, capable to lead to relatively re-
liable and valid outcomes if followed closely.
279
 Nevertheless, this procedure might be 
expensive and time consuming. Businesses seem to react to the increased cost of CBA 
implementation, as it will decrease their competitiveness in the world market. The fact 
that CV will be used extensively by trustees to estimate passive use values for all types 
of cases regardless of the degree of potential injury will generate large estimates of 
damage. This being the case, insurance companies might view such future claims as 
"unbounded" and thus be reluctant to insure certain activities that may give rise to natu-
ral resource damage claims.
280
 
3.4.4  CV in the ELD: Challenging its receptive openness Directive 2004/35/EC in 
favor of possible efficiency gains 
To date, CV method has been developed and applied in a larger extent in the US rather 
than the EU. This is partially justifiable, because of the absence of guidance regarding 
the use of valuation techniques within the EU legislation. However, several studies con-
ducted in EU Member States, have demonstrated that there is awareness over the CV 
method and that it is publically acceptable. Noticeable surveys regarding the potential 
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and the application of CV have been conducted in UK and Scandinavia and since 1990s 
France and Denmark have entered into the research field.
281
  
A more systematic and compensatory implementation of CV has been observed in 
Germany and the Netherlands. These countries have approached the US patern in rela-
tion to the use of CV in the decision- making process. Both countries have given priori-
ty to the implementation of CV to air-pollution cases, with the Netherlands being the 
first EU Member State, which used the CV method in practice. In UK CBA dominates 
the government appraisals of projects and policies, although guidelines boosting the use 
of CBA are also absent from most national legislations.
282
 
The experience gained in the EU during the last decades shows that CV is a promising 
technique, which has a lot to contribute to public decision-making. It is necessary 
though that legal provisions be adopted, in order to promote a symbiotic relationship 
between decision makers and economists.
283
 
3.4.5 Revealed Preferences Methods 
This category of valuation techniques is also known as “Indirect” techniques, the most 
common of which is the Hedonic Pricing and Travel Cost method. Each approach has a 
different conceptual basis and applies to different environmental goods, though both 
concur in that they use market information and actual behavior in order to value non-
market impacts. 
3.4.6  Hedonic Pricing Method (HPM) 
This technique was firstly proposed and used in the early 1970s and was widely applied 
in atmospheric pollution cases. Furthermore, it can be used to estimate economic bene-
fits or costs associated with environmental quality and/or environmental amenities, in-
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cluding water quality and noise, proximity to landfill or recreational sites and aesthetic 
views. However, it is widely used in order to value environmental amenities that affect 
the price of residential properties. For instance, clean air is a non-market environmental 
good, it does influence housing prices though. According to hedonic pricing method, 
there is a positive relationship between the prices that individuals are willing to pay for 
housing and the quality of ambient air standards. Consequently, house pricing is consid-
ered to reveal information about the air quality as well.
284
 
 More specifically, any particular house can be described by a combination of character-
istics, which usually include the housing structures (age, fireplaces, living area), the 
neighborhood variables (housing density, school quality, public safety expenditure), the 
accessibility variables (distance to beach) and air pollution variables (log of ambient 
concentration of suspended particulates). The combination of these characteristics for a 
particular house determines its price.  
The role of HDM is to indicate the individuals’ marginal WTP for each housing charac-
teristic. The procedure for this estimation requires the collection of large amounts of 
data, including rent and/or house prices, as well as characteristics of properties in an ar-
ea. This data is then used as input in statistical techniques, in order to estimate a hedonic 
price function, which constitutes a locus of equilibrium prices for the sample of houses. 
These prices result from the interaction of buyers and sellers in the property market. The 
marginal implicit price is compared to the buyer’s valuation of the characteristics. The 
buyer will choose those levels of characteristics, so that their valuation equals the im-
plicit price.
285
    
The main strength of HDM is that it is based on individuals’ actual choices and not on 
their intentions. Furthermore, given that data collection in property markets values can 
be realized relatively easily and with reliable values, results are considered to be rela-
tively valid. However, HDM requires a large amount of data, which is not always easily 
accessible, thus the technique might prove to be expensive. Another limitation of HDM 
is the fact that it is based on the individuals’ WTP for perceived environmental proper-
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ties and their consequences on humans. However, if respondents are not aware of the 
inextricable linkage between the environmental attributes and the benefit or harm to 
them and their property, results will not be reliable, as home prices will not represent 
their true value. Another weakness of the technique is that it is based on the individuals’ 
WTP, which is limited by their income. However, property markets might be influenced 
by other factors too, such as interest rates or taxation, which are not taken under consid-
eration in the technique.
286
   
3.4.7 Travel Cost method (TCM) 
This technique was firstly developed by Clawson and Knetsch and its main idea is that 
the values that individuals place on environmental amenities should emanate from the 
costs incurred by individuals in order to experience the environmental services.
287
 TCM 
is used to assess use values associated with recreational sites. Precisely, the method es-
timates benefits or costs emanating from changes in environmental quality, elimination 
of an existing site and addition of a new recreational site. The ‘price’ of access to the 
recreational site is represented by time and travel cost expenses in order to access the 
site. Thus, individuals’ willingness to pay to visit the site can be estimated according to 
the number of trips that they make at different travel costs. This could be compared to 
the individuals’ willingness to pay for a marketed good based on the quantity demanded 
at different prices. Total amenity value is inferred by aggregating the individual val-
ues.
288
   
The fact that TCM includes time costs of travel is considered to be of great interest in 
the literature. The time that individuals need in order to access the site incorporates an 
opportunity cost that should be estimated. This cost represents the highest value that a 
productive resource such as a natural resource, could return if placed in its best alterna-
tive use. However, there are a number of impediments regarding the estimation of time 
cost. It is widely accepted that the cost of not working or alternatively the wage rate is 
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the proper way to value time. However, the fact that a portion of individuals may not 
belong to the labor force causes problem in time cost estimation. 
In addition, for some individuals the time they spend in order to visit the site is consid-
ered to be part of the total leisure, thus it has positive and not negative value.
289
  
The number of visits to the site is also influenced by several factors, with distance being 
one of the most important ones. The individuals who live far from the site will access it 
less often. In addition, people with higher income usually travel more often. Further-
more, the number of alternative sites or substitutes as well as personal interest in the 
specific site, also influence the number of visits to the site.  
 
According to Ulibarri, the greatest disadvantage of Travel Cost method as well as other 
indirect techniques is that they cannot be used unless there is some easily observable 
behavior that can be used to reveal values.
290
 TCM has a limited scope of application, as 
it requires user participation and it cannot be applied in order to estimate non-use val-
ues. Therefore, the benefits of preserving a site with unique qualities might be underes-
timated. Furthermore, the model assumes that individuals take a trip for a single pur-
pose; this is an idealized scenario though. Travel costs of multipurpose trips remain dif-
ficult to be estimated. 
 
Nevertheless, TCM is a relatively uncontroversial method, as it is modeled on standard 
economic techniques for measuring values and it is based on individuals’ actual behav-
ior. In addition, it is easy to be implemented and interpreted and it is relatively inexpen-
sive.
291
 
3.5 Conclusions 
Putting a monetary value on the nonmarket environmental goods and services may be-
get ethical concerns, although it is deemed imperative in order for environmental dam-
ages to be fairly and effectively fronted, without causing severe environmental degrada-
tion and as a consequence, harm to human health. Thus, Natural Resource Damage As-
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sessment regulations are of great importance and are explicitly stressed in both the US 
and EU environmental legislations. 
 Both legislative regimes introduce the notion of monetary valuation for the estimation 
of the cost of environmental damage. Monetary valuation is deemed to be even more 
significant in cases that the environmental damage occurred is of great severity and/or 
the injured site is of great scarcity.  
Furthermore, compensatory restoration which is estimated by monetary valuation tech-
niques is considered to be appropriate the more geographically distant is the alternative 
site from the injured one and the more the measures taken are differentiated from the 
primary remediation measures. Positive impacts of a respective EU regulations will de-
pend on the willingness in the EU member states to apply economic valuation meth-
ods.
292
   
CERCLA provides for some general guidelines for the application of valuation tech-
niques in order for compensatory remediation costs to be assessed, whereas the ELD 
refers to monetary valuation only in a general spectrum.  
OPA has contributed a lot to the boost of Contingent Valuation Method with the ap-
pointment of NOAA Panel in 1993. CV is the most controversial assessment method 
which is though widely applied in both the US and the EU. In the debate over the ap-
propriate uses of the CV the main concerns are whether this method supports what it 
purports to show and whether its application produces consistent results. These validity 
and reliability issues concerning the underlying technique has also triggered great criti-
cism on whether it should be used in litigation and be admissible in the courts. Howev-
er, doubts regarding the applicability of CV are expected to be eliminated, as present 
studies and useful guidelines could constitute a helpful background for its future use. As 
a consequence, the use of CV method is not expected to counter efficiency problems in 
the future. 
 To date, techniques for the monetary valuation of environmental damage have been 
more extensively developed and applied in the US, rather than in the EU. CV as well as 
other valuation techniques are in a relatively early stage in the EU, with little bibliog-
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raphy to have been occupied with their applicability, setting the thorough examination 
of them difficult. CV is already implemented in some Member States for the estimation 
of both use and non-use values. Its wide spectrum of application make CV flexible and 
easily applicable, however, an appropriate legal background is necessary in order to 
boost the reliable development and implementation of the method. Taken as example 
the US case, only with appropriate guidelines and existing studies the CV method could 
gain the states’ and public’s approval.  
Travel cost and Hedonic pricing methods are also promising valuation techniques; how-
ever their narrower application fields might constitute a substantial impediment for their 
further implementation at the moment. 
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4 Final Conclusions 
 The first part of this thesis endeavored to analyze in detail the regime of the Liability 
Directive from an economic point of view. The ELD constitutes a framework directive, 
which is based on the polluter-pays principle, thus the examination of whether this di-
rective leads to economic efficient outcomes is imperative. Although ELD constitutes 
an innovation on the level of the European Community, it did not escape intense criti-
cism. The directive establishes only a form of minimum protection for the environment 
and it does not aim at harmonizing fully the national legislations. It was criticized for 
having a narrow scope of application, as well as being complex and ambiguous. There-
fore, its implementation encountered impediments, one of which was the transposition 
to national laws. In addition, Member States are granted a large amount of discretion 
regarding significant points of the Directive which might undermine a uniform imple-
mentation into their national legislations.  
Furthermore, some issues included in the Directive that have triggered great controversy 
among scholars, are scrutinized from an economic perspective. The most important of 
these issues are insolvency of the polluter, causation link between the operator and the 
damage caused, retroactive application of the Directive and defenses of the polluters.  
The US legislation seems to outmatch in the whole the European Directive, as it pro-
motes a more circumstantial and accurate legislative frame. Many provisions of the 
ELD have been based on the respective provisions of the US regimes, namely CERCLA 
and/or OPA, especially regarding issues for which the US disposes long time experi-
ence. The ELD provisions for natural resource damage assessment rely basically on 
those of OPA.  
Both CERCLA and OPA focus on the restoration of the injured natural resource to its 
baseline condition. CERCLA focuses its interest on the monetary valuation of the dam-
aged resources with equivalent methods, as suggested in its provisions. OPA supports 
the non-market valuation techniques, without indicating them in detail though. On the 
contrary, the normative program of the ELD foresees only a general direction for mone-
tary valuation, permitting the implementation of economic valuation techniques though; 
in my point of view, the legislator seems that did not want to be bound to a specific 
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damage assessment method. The significance of the estimation of the cost of compensa-
tory restoration is extremely highlighted under OPA. Unlike CERCLA, OPA enables 
the minimization of the risk of disputes. The development of any positive impacts of 
economic assessment concepts of CERCLA and OPA on the specific economic moti-
vated provisions in Annex of the Directive will depend on the willingness in the EU 
member states to apply economic valuation methods. 
To date, the valuation techniques which are described in the present thesis and are used 
for the environmental damage assessment, have been more extensively developed and 
applied in the US rather than in Europe. A notable observation is that, in part, this re-
flects the difference in public concern for the consequences of changes in the quality 
and quantity of available natural resources and the effects of pollution on human health. 
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